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Hard Data and its Soft Underbelly
MICHAEL SHAFIR
As in many other former communist countries of East Central Europe1, 
antisemitism in Romania resurged almost concomitantly with the demise of the former 
regime2. Empirical research on antisemitism, however, emerged only considerably 
later and did not take off as a main focus until the establishment of the National 
Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania ”Elie Wiesel” (INSHREW) in 
2005. This does not imply that the subject of Jews, attitudes to Jews measured by 
instruments such as stereotypic perceptions and/or ”social distance”, or attitudes 
toward controversial Romanian historical figures linked to the country’s antisemitic 
past was not tangentially or even directly tackled on occasion. What lacked until 
2005, however, was an effort to systematically (among other instruments, employing 
a standard questionnaire capable of rendering comparative results) place under 
focus the phenomenon in its synchronic and diachronic unfolding. In other words, 
the task of gathering longitudinal data on antisemitism in the country permitting 
to forge a ”perceptual map” that would select in consistent aspects and select out 
inconsistencies3 is still in the bud.
”Us vs. Them”
As articles in the daily press or in weeklies with direct or allusive antisemitic 
tones began to appear, the daily Adevărul on 27-28 July 1991 for the first time 
mentioned a poll in which Jews were subjected to scrutiny as a separate category 
of national minorities subjected to what the Romanian Institute for Public Opinion 
Polling (IRSOP)4 either a ”press syndrome” (i.e. reports designed to attract readership 
by exploiting existing prejudice) or a ”social syndrome”. Respondents were asked to 
1  Randolph L. BRAHAM (ed.), Antisemitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in 
Postcommunist Eastern Europe, The Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies Graduate Center/
The City University of New York and Social Science Monographs. Distributed by Columbia 
University Press, New York and Boulder, 1994.
2  Michael SHAFIR, ”Anti-Semitism without Jews in Romania”, in Anti-Semitism in Post-
Totalitarian Europe, Franz Kafka Publishers, Prague, 1993, pp. 204-226.
3  On the importance of such a map see Raluca SOREANU, ”Autodefinire şi heterodefinire 
a românilor şi maghiarilor din România: O analiză empirică a stereotipurilor etnice şi a 
fundamentelor diferite de definire a identităţii etnice”, in Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea KIVU, 
Monica ROBOTIN (eds.), Barometrul relaţiilor etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă asupra climatului 
interetnic din România, Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, Cluj, 2005, p. 65.
4  IRSOP was set up in 1990 as a governmental institute. Not long after it was privatized 
and proved to be one of the most successful polling institutes in the country, though it took 
some time for it to shed off suspicions of serving former President Ion Iliescu and his different 
governments.
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mention whether they agreed or disagreed that the Romanian media carry articles 
against any of the following ethnic groups:
Table 1
Do you agree or disagree for the Romanian media to write against…1
Agree% Disagree% DK/NA%
Jews 11 78 11
Germans 4 86 10
Hungarians 24 65 11
Romanians 5 89 6
Serbs 4 85 11
Gypsies1 41 50 9
As this table shows, some two respondents in five condoned the publication of 
articles critical of the country’s Roma minority, whereas only one in ten respondents 
endorsed similar articles directed at the address of Jews. Germans (alongside Serbs) 
occupied a privileged position, with Hungarians (soon after the infamous Târgu-Mureş 
[Marosvásárhely] clashes of March 1990) occupying a somewhat less privileged position 
as targets of criticism, but still considerably safer than the Roma. While subsequent 
surveys would show some fluctuations in attitudes towards the Hungarian minority 
(the general trend being that of improvement) and towards the German minority (a 
rather less, though still positive attitude), rejection of the Roma (measured by studies 
focusing on either social representation or social distance or stereotypes) has been 
and remains the single most consistent aspect in Romania, as indeed in the rest of the 
former communist countries2. For example, in a survey carried out by the Bucharest-
based Center of Urban and Regional Sociology (CURS) in December 1997, 52 percent 
of the respondents said they had ”favorable” sentiments towards Hungarians (vs. 41 
percent admitting their sentiments were ”unfavorable”), but no less than two in three 
(67%) were negatively inclined towards the Roma minority (vs. 27 percent). Jews, 
on the other hand were unfavorably viewed by only 15 percent, and no less than 69 
percent claimed their sentiments vis-à-vis this minority were favorable3.
To what extent, however, do surveys where respondents are straightforwardly 
asked to depict their sentiments towards a national minority reflect reality? In a public 
opinion poll conducted by the Bucharest-based Institute for Marketing and Polls 
(IMAS) in June 2009, respondents were asked to ascribe on a 1-5 scale their perception 
of three pejorative words employed in reference to Hungarians (bozgor), Jews (jidan4) 
and Roma (ţigan). By the time the survey was carried out, the first term had been 
eliminated by the Romanian Academy from its Explicative Dictionary of the Romanian 
Language (DEX)5, but the two other terms still figured in, despite protests stemming 
1  IRSOP poll based on a representative sample of 2,179 persons, margin of error ± 2.1%. 
2  See Ioan MĂRGINEAN (coord.), Cercetări cu privire la minoritatea roma, Ministerul 
Informaţiei Publice, Oficiul Naţional pentru Romi, Bucureşti, 2001, pp. 15, 18.
3  See Dan OPRESCU, ”Despre romi”, Revista 22, no. 6, 10-16 February 1998.
4   Best rendered in English as ”kike” or ”yid”.
5  Cf. Academia Română. Institutul de Lingvistică ”Iorgu Iordan”, DEX. Dicţionarul 
explicativ al limbii române, ediţia a II-a, Univers enciclopedic, Bucureşti, 1996.
559
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XII • no. 4 • 2012
Political Antisemitism in Romania? 
from Jewish and Romani NGOs. After initial attempts to justify their presence, the 
Academy’s Linguistic Institute consented in 2012 to specify that the latter two terms 
were pejoratives, but left them in the dictionary1.
Table 22
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means ”Absolutely inoffensive” and 5 ”Very offensive”, 
please tell me how offensive seems to you the term
Absolutely 
inoffensive
%
2
%
3
%
4
%
Very 
offensive
%
DK, NA
%
bozgor 15.9 10.0 14.5 19.4 36.6 3.6
jidan 19.8 13.2 17.4 19.2 27.5 2.9
ţigan 31.5 12.7 13.8 16.7 23.6 1.7
By and large, then, Table 2 seems to reconfirm the findings in Table 1. A significantly 
larger plurality of Romanians is aware of the offensiveness of the pejorative when 
it comes to Hungarians than the plurality of those conscious of it when Jews are 
concerned. More significant, when it comes to the Roma minority, the plurality 
switches from ”very offensive” to ”absolutely inoffensive”. In the case of Jews, 
differences of gender in appraising the pejorative as ”very offensive” are statistically 
insignificant (28.2% men vs. 26.8% women), but this is not a factor differentiating the 
gender division in the Hungarian case either (37.6 vs. 35.6%). Not so in the case of 
the Roma, where women are both more aware of the term as being ”very offensive” 
(25.6% vs. 21.4% for men); hand in hand, a significantly lower segment of women 
(28.2%) than men (34.9%) responded that ţigan was an ”absolutely inoffensive) term.
Age is definitely playing a role. In the case of Jews, nearly one in four respondents 
aged 45-59 (24%) were of the opinion that jidan is an ”absolutely inoffensive” term, 
somewhat higher than those aged 60 and over (22.3 percent). At the other end of 
the spectrum, the age-break 30-44 scored the largest plurality (32.1%) among those 
who perceived the term as ”very offensive”, closely followed by those aged 45-68 
(30.4%) and those aged 60 and over. It can thus be concluded that the age-break 45 and 
over is the most opinionated at both ends of the scale. As for Hungarians, there is a 
statistically significant difference between the youngest group (18-29) of those saying 
bozgor is an ”absolutely inoffensive” term (18.8%) and the age groups 30-44 (14.0%) 
and 60+ (14.5), whereas the same difference in the case of the group 45-59 (16.6%) is 
within the margin of error. The picture is different at the other end of the spectrum: 
more than two in five respondents aged 30-44 (41%) and 45-59 (40.5 percent) said 
1  ”Academia Română somată să scoată ’jidan’ din dicţionar”, Ziua veche, 8 August 
2011, http://www.ziuaveche.ro/actualitate-interna/social/academia-romana-e-somata-
sa-scoata-“jidan”-din-dictionar-46022.html, acessed on August 8, 2011; Raluca ION, ”A apărut 
DEX-ul corect politic. Cum a modificat Academia Română definiţiile cuvintelor ’ţigan’, ’jidan’, 
’homosexua litate’ şi ’iubire’”, Gândul, 25 April 2012, http://www.gandul.info/news/a-aparut-
dex-ul-corect-politic-cum-a-modificat-academia-romana-definitiile-cuvintelor-tigan-jidan-
homosexualitate-si-iubire-9572510, acessed on April 25, 2011.
2  Sondaj Romnibus realizat de IMAS pentru LDK Consultants, (Bucharest, June 2009). 
Multista dial sample of 1,249 respondents carried out between 10-15 June 2009. Margin of error 
± 2.7%.
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the term was ”very offensive” and more than one in three of those aged 60 and over 
(35.3%) were of this opinion, the smallest score being registered among the youngest 
age group (28.6%). It would seem, then, that in this case the youngest group is also 
the most inclined to dismiss the sentiments of the Hungarian minority. In the case of 
the Roma, between a ”low” one in four aged (25.4) 30-44 and a high 35.3 aged 45-59 
perceive ”ţigan” as being an ”absolutely inoffensive” term and between one in four 
(26.2%) aged 30-44 and roughly one in five for all other age groups responded that the 
term was ”very offensive”.
When residence is taken into consideration, a highly interesting factor emerges: 
in all three cases, the highest score for those believing the terms were ”absolutely 
inoffensive” is rendered by those residing in small towns with a population of 
between 10-49 000 inhabitants1. Significant differences emerged in the case of the 
”very offensive” answers as well: in the case of the Jews, the most aware that jidan has 
a pejorative meaning were residents of middle-sized towns (50-199 000 inhabitants), 
37% of whom returned that response; they were followed by residents of rural areas 
(28.6%) and those residing in small towns (23.2%), with those residing in large towns 
with a population of over 200 000 occupying the last place (21.8%). A nearly similar 
picture was rendered in the case of the Roma: the largest awareness of the pejorative 
sense of the word was found among residents of middle-sized towns (29.3%), followed 
by rural areas (25.7%), large towns (20.4%) and small towns (20.4%). Finally, far the 
most aware of the pejorative meaning in the case of the Hungarians were the residents 
of middle-sized towns (50.9%) and the least aware of it were residents of large towns 
(26.3%); those residing in rural areas scored higher (38.1%) than those residing in 
small (33.4), middle-sized or large towns.
Surveys carried out in Romania have repeatedly showed that the strongest 
rejection of the Hungarian minority is found in regions where members of that minority 
are either historically absent or at present in insignificant numbers2. This may well 
explain why residents of middle-sized towns and rural areas, as most Transylvanian 
settlements are, tend to view their neighbors belonging to the Hungarian minority 
with a more benevolent eye and be more aware of the significance of pejorative 
meanings. The same applies to some extent to the Roma, since a large proportion of 
that population resides in middle-sized towns and rural areas. But since Romania’s 
Jewish population has been reduced to a meager few thousands3, with practically no 
1  The four types of localities into which the sample was divided were as follows: rural; 
small town (10-49 000); midlle-sized towns (50-199 000); large towns (200 000 inhabitants and 
over).
2  As reported by the daily Evenimentul zilei on 8 December 1993 in reference to a poll carried 
out by CURS and by the weekly Revista 22, no. 31, 3-9 August 1994 in reference to a survey carried 
out by IMAS. The latter findings also reported by the daily Adevărul, 13 August 1994. 
3  According to the census carried out in March 2002, only 6,057 Jews (0,02% of the total 
population) were still living in Romania (5 870 had defined themselves as Jews according to 
nationality and 6 057 according to religion. 951 said Yiddish was their mother tongue. See 
”Structura etnodemografică a României”, http://recensamant.referinte.transindex.ro/?pg=8, 
acessed on April 12, 2012. The results of a census carried out in July 2011 have not been 
published in full and number of Jews is small enough to have been included under ”other 
minorities” in preliminary reports; see Cristian ANDREI, ”Recensământul populaţiei, primele 
rezultate. Câţi români sunt, câţi etnici maghiari şi cât de mare este minoritatea romă”, Gândul, 2 
February 2012, http://www.gandul.info/news/recensamantul-populatiei-primele-rezultate-
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Jews residing in the countryside and very few in small towns, this explanation can 
hardly apply in their case.
Is historical memory, then, playing a role? The results of the IMAS survey seem 
to point in that direction, since when the ”historical region” residence is taken into 
consideration, the largest share of those opinionating that jidan is a ”very offensive” 
term is occupied by respondents residents of Moldova (40.0%), where a large 
proportion of Romania’s Jewish population resided before emigrating to Israel and 
elsewhere1. This is not necessarily an indication of philosemitism, however, but simply 
of a more acute awareness of the pejorative than in the other Romanian regions. For 
the other two pejorative terms, regional residence confirms in the case of Hungarians 
that actual regular contact might increase awareness of the ”other’s” sensitivities. 
Residents of Transylvania, where the bulk of the Hungarian minority lives, were 
more aware of the pejorative sense (52.4%) than residents of Moldova, which has a 
small Hungarian minority (45.2%), and considerably more than residents of either 
Bucharest (20.9%) Muntenia (20.3%). On the other hand, residents of Muntenia, with 
very few Hungarian minority members, scored by far higher than all other regions in 
claims that the term has no pejorative meaning at all (25.3%). But the hypothesis of 
”the closer acquainted, the more empathic” is not backed by the data on the Romani 
minority. Unawareness, possibly combined with adversity, is dominating in all three 
”historical regions”, with Moldova scoring lowest at the ”absolutely inoffensive” pole 
(19%, vs. 37.8 for Muntenia, 33.7 for Bucharest and 31.8 for Transylvania) and highest 
(31%) at the ”very offensive” pole (vs. 24% for Transylvania, 21% for Muntenia and 
15% for Bucharest).
Education seems to play a somewhat significant, but by no means crucial role, 
according to the findings of this survey. Differences in the case of Jews for ”absolutely 
inoffensive” are of at most four percentage points between the higher educated 
(17.2%) and high school and post-high school education (21.2). This factor is more 
relevant in the case respondents who chose to give the ”very offensive” answer: 
the difference between graduates of high school and post high schools here (31.6%) 
and the higher educated (23.6%) is of full eight percentage points. These two age 
groups are thus dominating both ends of the spectrum. Surprisingly to some extent 
(but not for those familiar with Romanian history), ”intellectuals” (defined as holders 
of university diplomas for this purpose) seem to be less willing to be aware of the 
pejorative meaning of jidan (23.6%) not only than graduates of high schools, but also 
of gymnasium (10 schooling years) or vocational schools (27.4%) and even of the 
lower (up to 8 years) educated (24.5%).
Educational differences between those opinionating that bozgor had no pejorative 
meaning whatever where of at most 3.7 percentage points (between graduates of high 
schools or post-high school education, 17.1% and university degree holders, 13.4%) and 
2.8 percentage points (up to eight schooling years). At the other end of the spectrum, 
these differences were statistically of roughly the same (in)significance: 39% of the 
cati-romani-sunt-cati-etnici-maghiari-si-cat-de-mare-este-minoritatea-roma-9200308, acessed 
on February 2, 2012.
1  410 000 Jews out of nearly 800 000 had survived the Second World War. By 1961 more 
than half of the survivors had emigrated, Romania’s Jewish population at that time being 
225 000; in 1968, less than half of the latter figure (about 100 000) were still living in the country. 
For yearly emigration figures to Israel see Radu IOANID, The Ransom of the Jews. The Story of the 
Extraordinary Secret Bargain between Romania and Israel, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 2005, pp. 185-186.
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high school and post high school educated said the idiom was ”very offensive”, as did 
35.1 percent of those with up to eight years of schooling, 36% percent of gymnasium 
and vocational schools graduates and (on last place!) intellectuals (34.8%).
Summing up the findings of the IMAS survey relevant for Jews, one gets the 
following data
Table 31
On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means ”Absolutely inoffensive” and 5 ”Very offensive”, 
please tell me how offensive seems to you the term jidan
n= 1, 9
Absolutely 
inoffensive
%
2
%
3
%
4
%
Very 
offensive
%
DK, NA
%
Sex
Male
Female
22.4
17.4
12.3
14.1
18.4
16.5
17.2
21.1
28.2
26.8
1.4
4.2
Age
18-29
30-44
45-59
60+
17.6
15.2
24.0
22.3
17.7
6.9
16.4
12.6
19.5
20.1
12.4
17.7
19.4
23.3
13.6
20.1
23.4
32.1
30.4
24.0
2.5
2.5
3.2
3.2
Residence
Rural
10-49 000
50-199 000
200 000+
17,4
26.8
19.5
19.1
10.8
13.3
12.2
18.3
19.2
14.6
14.1
18.7
20.6
18.9
14.1
20.2
28.6
23.2
37.5
21.8
3.4
3.1
2.6
1.9
Region
Transylvania
Muntenia
Moldova
Bucharest
20.2
26.2
11.5
13.4
11.4
12.8
10.9
26.5
19.3
16.9
13.9
20.3
18.1
18.2
21.6
21.5
28.5
22.0
40.0
16.8
2.5
3.9
2.2
1.5
Education
1-8 yrs.
Vocational, 
gymnasium
High school, 
post-high. sch.
University
20.8
18.4
21.2
17.2
13.2
13.1
12.9
14.3
15.9
19.9
15.6
20.8
20.5
18.4
17.3
22.6
24.5
27.4
31.6
23.6
5.2
2.9
1.3
1.4
Stereotypes
Stereotyping is common in every nation, indeed there is no group (ethnic 
or otherwise) and probably no individual that is totally immune to it. Basically, 
stereotyping is based on self-image, on one hand, and hetero-images on the other, 
where members of the ”in-group” tend to depict themselves in positive terms and 
1  Sondaj Romnibus realizat de IMAS pentru LDK Consultants, p. 27.
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produce a somewhat negative and even discriminatory image of ”the other”1. Based 
on opinion polls and/or focus groups, several studies were produced in Romania 
tackling ”in the mirror” mutual perceptions of the ethnic majority, on one hand, and 
different its different ethnic minorities (mainly Hungarians, Roma, Germans and Jews) 
on the other hand2. By and large, these studies confirm the findings mentioned above, 
namely the general depiction of the Romani minority in negative terms (f. example 
”dirty,” ”thieves” and ”lazy”), of the Germans in positive terms (such as ”civilized”, 
and ”diligent”), and of Hungarians in both positive (”diligent”, ”hospitable”) and 
negative (”vain”, ”egoist”) images3. I shall therefore concentrate on the stereotypical 
depiction of Jews in two surveys conducted in 2001 and 2002, and on an additional 
poll carried out in 2008. The three surveys are not quite comparable, as the first two 
were based on three separate subsamples (Romanians, Hungarians and Roma) with 
an additional sub-subsample for Romanian Transylvanians, whereas the last did not 
make that distinction. In addition, the latter survey included groups (Arabs, Chinese, 
Africans, Jehova’s Witnesses) not examined in the former two surveys and excluded 
one group (Germans) scrutinized there.
In all three surveys, respondents were asked to choose up to and at most three 
opposite characteristics out of 12 pairs4 of presumably opposing traits for Romanians, 
Hungarians, Roma, and Jews, which should have rendered a scale of prejudice 
stereotyping. In the 2001 sample, respondents of Romanian ethnic origin chose 
”entrepreneurial” (33%) and ”religious” (31%) most frequently as characterizing Jews 
on what the questionnaire designers viewed as the ”positive pole” and ”egoists” (9%) 
was the most frequently mentioned characteristic at the ”negative pole”. Interestingly 
enough, there was only a difference of frequency, but not of picked stereotypes among 
the three subsamples at the ”positive end”: ethic Hungarians and Roma respondents 
also chose ”entrepreneurial” and ”religious” most often. The former group viewed 
the two traits in nearly equal proportion (30% for entrepreneurship and 29% for 
religiousness), whereas the Roma chose ”religious” (23%) slightly more often than 
”entrepreneurial” (20%). The three subsamples differed in their choice of negative 
characteristics, however: the most frequent choice of Romanian ethnics was ”egoists” 
(9%), Hungarian ethnics opted most frequently for ”divided” (8%), while Roma res-
pon dents picked ”hypocrites” more frequently than any other negative trend (9%)5.
The 2002 survey mirrored the same image of the Jews, with significantly higher 
options but many of the same choices. Nearly two in five ethnic Romanians (39.2%), over 
one half  (51.2%) ethnic Hungarians and more than one-third of the Roma respondents 
to the survey chose ”religious” at the positive pole, alongside ”intelligent” (31% of 
1  Aurora LIICEANU, ”Alteritate etnică şi imaginar colectiv”, in Gabriel BĂDESCU, 
Mircea KIVU, Monica ROBOTIN (eds.), Barometrul relaţiilor etnice 1994-2002...cit., pp. 56-57. 
2  For example, Alina MUNGIU-PIPPIDI, Transilvania subiectivă, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 
1999.
3  These examples are taken from a survey conducted in 2001 by Metro Media Transylvania 
and reported in Mircea KIVU, ”Comentarii pe marginea Barometrului Relaţiilor Interetnice”, in 
Rudolf POLEDNA, François RUEGG, Călin RUS (eds.), Interculturalitate. Cercetări şi perspective 
româneşti, Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2002, pp. 75-84.
4  The list of pairs used: Nice (Cumsecade)/Egoists; Hospitable/Hostile; Intelligent/Stupid; 
Dili gent/Lazy; Entrepreneurial/Neglectful; Trustworthy/Hypocrite; Modest/Conceited; ”Ho-
nest”/”Thievish”; United/Divided; Religious/Superstitious; Civilized/Uncivilized; Clean/Dirty.
5  Mircea KIVU, ”Comentarii...cit.”, p. 79.
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the Romanians, 31.4% of the Hungarian and 26.7% of the Roma). The third ”positive 
characteristic” opted for by respondents to this survey was ”nice” (cumsecade)1. 
Unlike the 2001 and the 2002 surveys, a poll conducted by Gallup Romania on 
behalf of the National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD) in July 2008 
was based on a mixed sample, i.e. Romanian and members of other ethnicities pulled 
together2. Jews were again mostly depicted as ”entrepreneurial” (32%), ”religious” 
(26%) and ”intelligent” (23%) on the positive side, and as ”egoists” (10%), ”proud” 
(6%) and ”superstitious” (5%) on the negative side. The prejudice stereotyping scale 
also included Romanians, Roma, Hungarians, Arabs, Chinese, Africans and (oddly 
enough, since they are neither a separate ethnic group nor a separate race), Jehova’s 
Witnesses. Findings, including a positive-negative traits balance, are rendered below:
Table 4
Which traits do you believe best characterize the……
(three possible choices)
Ethnic/religious minority First three choices Positive/negative balance
Romanians Diligent
Hospitable
Nice
3.8
Roma Thieves
Dirty
Lazy
0.3
Hungarians Diligent
Civilized
United
2.5
Arabs Religious
United
Entrepreneurial
1.5
Chinese Diligent
Entrepreneurial
Intelligent
5.7
Africans Uncivilized
Dirty
Religious2
0.9
Jews3 Entrepreneurial
Religious
Intelligent
3.8
Jehovah’s Witnesses Religious
United
Superstitious
1.6
1  Aurora LIICEANU, ”Alteritate etnică...cit.”, pp. 59-60. No findigs for ”negative traits” 
were reported.
2  The Gallup Organization Romania, Percepţii şi atitudini ale populaţiei României faţă de 
fenomenul de discriminare. Cercetare realizată la cererea Consiliului Naţional pentru Combaterea 
Discriminării, Gallup International, Bucureşti, iulie 2008. The survey was based on a probabilistic 
tri-stadial stratified sample of 1 200 respondents aged 18 and over and had a margin of error of 
± 2.8%. The sample was weighted for the variables of geographical region, place of residence, 
sex, age and ethnicity. It was carried out between 27 June-7 July 2008.
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Apart from reconfirming the earlier findings on the Roma, who are clearly at 
the bottom of the ladder and only slightly above zero, the most surprising finding of 
Table 4 is that Chinese are depicted by far above any other ethnic group, including 
Romanians themselves. The finding seems to be way out of the presumptions on 
which self-and-hetero stereotype images are constructed, as in the case of the Chinese 
the positive/negative balance is by nearly two percentage points higher than that of 
Romanians themselves. Yet stereotypes are not necessarily constructed on the base of 
actual contact. According to the 2002 census, the Chinese minority in Romania is close 
to insignificant; it numbered no more than 2 2431, all of them living in Bucharest2. It 
is obviously a community that does not in any way endanger the ethnic Romanian 
majority. But neither does the low-scoring (second lowest after the Roma) African 
community (no numbers available), or, for that matter, the Jews (less than 0.02%), 
whose number by 2002 was of more than 1000 in only two of the country’s ”historical 
regions”: Bucharest and Bukovina3.
In the 2008 Gallup poll Jews score considerable higher then Hungarians in the 
positive/negative balance, thus reconfirming the findings of the 2001 poll conducted 
by Metro Media Transylvania. That survey (the national sample) returned a 1.31 
”meridian attitudinal score” for Jews, vs. 0.45 for Hungarians4. But is such findings 
fully depicting reality? As András Kovács has demonstrated for the case of Hungary, 
a not insignificant part of ”the Devil” might hide in the ”Don’t know, no answer” 
returns. In other words, the more sensitive respondents perceive the issues at stake, 
the more often they might seek refuge in non-committance, thus avoiding to return 
perceived ”politically incorrect” answers5. This is one of the many strange legacies 
of the communist system and (this is my own assumption) one likely to be at peak 
among the oldest age groups. While in the case of Romanians and Roma the ”don’t 
know/now answers” were of a neglectful 1%, one in five did so in the case of the 
Hungarians (19%), but no less than one-third of the sample (33%) avoided replying 
to the question in the case of the Jews, as well as in the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
(34%), the Arabs (35%) and the Chinese (36%). In the case of Africans, over two in five 
respondents (43%) did so. For now, the Romanian pollster that would follow Kovács’s 
refined tuning in the search for ”latent antisemitism” is, alas, not in offing in this or 
other cases.
One last aspect concerning stereotypes. It is questionable whether the ”opposing 
pairs” are really what they were taken to be by questionnaire designers, who 
apparently opted for utilizing bona fide instruments designed for other social contexts. 
In Romania’s case, ”entrepreneurial” might be something else than the opposite of 
”neglectful”; it simply might be a ”politically correct” synonym for “geşeftar” (from 
the gesheft in Yiddish), a rather pejorative expression often used in reference to Jews 
1  ”Structura etnodemografică...cit.”.
2  ”Comunităţi etnice în România”, Wikipedia (Romanian edition), http://ro.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Comunităţi_etnice_în_România, accessed on April 12, 2012.
3  „Comunităţi etnice în România”, cit.
4  Mircea KIVU, ”Comentarii...cit.”, p. 49. The score for other ethnicities in the 2001 survey 
was as follows: Romanians 2.18; Germans 2.03; Roma minus 1.83. The score for ”attitudes 
towards others”, which referred to perceptions of ethnicities other than the respondent’s own 
was 1.97. 
5  András KOVÁCS, The Stranger at Hand. Antisemitic Prejudices in Post-Communist Hungary, 
Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2011, pp. 85-86.
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and describing their alleged propensity to engaged in profiteering and other money-
making activities. Similarly, ”religious” might be a politically correct substitute for 
”bigoted” and even ”intelligent” might not stand in for the opposite of ”stupid”, but 
rather as a way of describing cunning. 
Using a different 12-pair list suggested by the INSHREW, a poll conducted 
between 27 December-11 January 2012 by the Bucharest-based TNS CSOP Romania 
on behalf of the CNCD1 produced on Jews2 findings considerably different from 
earlier polls, as shown by Table 5.
Table 5
I shall now read out a list of good points (calităţi). Please choose those that 
you consider the most representative for most Jews.
I shall now read out a list of deficiencies (defecte). Please choose those that 
you consider the most representative for most Jews.
n=1,400
Good points % Bad points %
United 18 Disunited 3
Peaceful 17 Aggressive 4
Diligent 16 Lazy 4
Self-confident 13 Lacking self-confidence 6
Serious 13 Unserious 3
Honest 11 Dishonest 7
Polite 9 Impolite 2
Courageous, Daring 9 Cowardly 3
Tolerant (hospitable) 7 Intolerant 11
Law-abiding 6 Law-disrespectful 2
Generous 5 Avaricious 29
Trustworthy 4 Untrustworthy 4
DK, NA 32 DK, NA 49
The findings of this survey evince even more emphatically the points raised in 
connection with the earlier surveys. First, no less than one-half of the respondents on 
”bad points” opted out of answering, and one-third of those responding on ”good 
points” did the same. There are strong reasons to suspect that some of these must 
be ”latent antisemites”. Second, the choice of pairing is still subject to interpretation. 
”United” very often expresses prejudice rather than praise, since ethnic majorities 
tend to attribute that trait to ”the other” to explain to themselves both group-failure 
and particularly give vent to concealed conspiracy-theory frustrations. It is revealing 
1  On a sample of 1 400 persons aged 18 and over, the margin of error being ± 2.6%. 
Probabilist Stratified sample according to region of development and residence, carried out in 
60 rural settlements, 57 towns and the Bucarest Municipality. Face to face interviewing at the 
respondents’ domicile. Weighted according to National Statistic Institute data. Cf. TNS CSOP, 
CNCD, Raport de cercetare. Percepţii şi atitudini privind discriminarea în România, TNS CSOP, 
CNCD, Bucureşti, 2012.
2  Other etnicities included in the poll were Romanians, Roma, Hungarians and Germans.
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in this sense that the respondents to this survey opted for ”united” as their most 
frequent choice to describe the alleged ”good points” of the Roma (64%)1 and of 
Hungarians (36%)2. Just as revealingly, by far the most ”bad points” choice for ethnic 
Romanians was ”disunited” (44%)3.
Social Distance
In December 1993 IMAS was commissioned by the Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg)-
based Korunk Friendship association to carry out an investigation on interethnic 
relations in Romania. In focus were relations between Romanian, Hungarians, 
Germans, Jews and Roma, measured, among other instruments, by utilizing a ”social 
distance” scale (Bogardus Scale), where 1 signifies the closest acceptable relationship to 
a member of a minority (member of the respondent’s family) and 7 the least acceptable 
(should not live in my country at all). The survey established that for Romanian ethnic 
social distance was growing from Germans (closest) to Hungarians, followed by Jews 
and Roma. Hungarian respondents returned identical social distances; just as in the 
Romanian case, social distance was at peak when members of the Roma minority were 
mentioned. Once again, social distance vis-à-vis Hungarians was narrower in the case 
of Romanians living in Transylvania and larger in the Romanian national sample4.
Subsequent surveys would also include sexual minorities (homosexuals and 
lesbians), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Muslims (Islam) believers, Arabs, Chinese, and (in 
one case5) citizens of the Moldovan Republic (Bessarabia), while excluding members 
of the German minority. In order to make data comparable, the following table sums 
up results returned by ethnic Romanian respondents for social distance vis-à-vis 
Hungarians, Jews and Roma. As the wording of the question was not always identical, 
these results must be taken with a pinch of salt. Thus, respondents to the 2003 Gallup 
survey were asked: ”In the following questions, we intend to see how comfortable 
you feel when interacting with different categories of people. Which is the closest 
relationship you would [be ready to] have with someone that is a…”; respondents 
to the other three surveys were asked: ”Which is the closest relationship you would 
accept to have with people belonging to the following [ethnic] minorities”. Answers 
reproduced in Table 6 indicate acceptance. where the smallest distance is reflected by 
those ready to have a person of the specified minority as a family member and the 
largest distance is reflected by respondents (not included in the table) unwilling to 
have a member of that minority live in or even visit their own country.
1  ”Courageous/daring” (29%) was on second place and ”self-confident” (18%) on third. 
There is ground to suspect that all three refered to the alleged criminal activities of the Romani 
minority.
2  ”Diligent” was second most opted for (23%) and ”self-confident” third (17%).
3  ”Lacking self-confidence” (24%) and ”cowardly” (15%) were on second and third place.
4  ”Români despre maghiari, maghiari despre români”, Revista 22, no. 31, 3-9 August 
1994. The representative sample was based on 1 022 interviews conducted at the respondents 
residence and had a margin of error of ±3%. 
5  Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Intoleranţă, discriminare şi autoritarism în opinia publică, 
Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Bucureşti, September 2003. Survey carried out by Gallup 
Romania and based on a representative sample of 1 500 respondents aged 18 and over. Stratified 
probabilistic three-stadial unweighted sample, margin of error ± 2.7%.
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Table 6
Social Distance 2003-2011-121
2003 2007 2010 2011-12
n= 1,500 1,026 1,400 1,400
H
%
J
%
R
%
H
%
J
%
R
%
H
%
J
%
R
%
H
%
J
%
R
%
Family 
member 15 21 7 12 7 2 27 14 11 25 12 8
Personal
friend 17 17 12 11 12 5 18 21 17 21 21 17
Neighbor 
(live in 
my town)
13 13 17 7 10 6 10 14 16 12 16 14
Work 
colleague 10 10 11 6 8 5 16 15 16 17 19 17
Visit 
(live in) 
Romania
31 27 31 40 42 48 18 24 25 15 21 28
Should 
not visit 
(live in)
Romania
8 4 13 9 7 19 4 3 8 4 3 7
DK, NA 6 8 9 15 14 15 7 9 7 6 8 9
Sources: Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Intoleranţă…cit.; Institutul Naţional pentru 
Studierea Holocaustului din România ”Elie Wiesel”, Sondaj de opinie privind Holocaustul din 
România şi perceptia relaţiilor interetnice, tnscsop, INSHREW, Bucureşti, 2007); TOTEM, Institutul 
Naţional pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România ”Elie Wiesel”, Fenomenul discriminării 
în România. Sondaj de opinie, TOTEM, INSHREW, Bucureşti, 2010; TNS CSOP, CNCD, Raport de 
cercetare...cit.
The most striking finding is that the results of the 2007 survey are so different from 
the other three surveys that one is inclined to believe that something must have gone 
astray with responses to this question. There simply was no event that would explain 
why Romanian respondents suddenly become so ”welcoming” of both Hungarians 
and Jews (two-in-five respondents or higher) and even to a greater extent of the Roma 
minority (nearly half of the sample). Returns from other years have between 15% 
(2011-12) and nearly one-third of the sample (2003) saying they would agree to having 
Hungarian ethnics visiting Romania or living there. The same applies to Jews, with 
one respondent in five or somewhat higher returning that response in the other three 
surveys. Nothing justifies the ”deviance”. And while acceptance of the Roma to either 
visit or live in Romania most likely reflects acquiescence to reality, there have been 
no grounds that would have turned nearly one-half of Romanian respondents that 
happy about a Romani presence. This is the advantage (or is it a disatvantage?) of 
1  For the purpose of longitudinal comparison ”live in my town” (asked in the 2003 
survey) has been combined with ”visit Romania” (not asked in that survey), resulting in a six-
point scale instead of the classical seven-point Bogardus scale. 
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longitudinal surveys. They may serve as warning systems. In what follows, then, we 
shall not take that survey into consideration. 
The remaining three surveys under consideration show that between one in 
five ethnic Romanians (2003) and one in ten (2010, 2011-12) display minimal social 
distance (member of one’s own family) vis-á-vis Jews and that roughly the inverse 
proportion in all three cases claim readiness to have a Jew as a personal friend (second 
best social distance, according to theory). There is a statistically significant drop in 
those displaying minimal social distance toward Jews from 2003 to 2010 and the trend 
seems to have continued in the following surveyed year. Those willing to have Jews 
as neighbors (considered to be third-best indicative of acceptance) are roughly within 
the margin of error around one-and-a-half Romanians out of ten but show a tendency 
to raise from survey to survey when it comes to the fourth level of acceptance, namely 
having a jew as a work colleague. At the other end, all three polls show under 5% 
positioning themselves in the largest social distance category. Yet only between one 
in four and one in five ethnic Romanians are ready to have Jews either living in the 
country or visiting it. This means that a good part of the three samples might have 
(once again) been displaying latent antisemitism and (unfortunately) this aspect 
remained hidden from the eyes of analysts.
Antisemitism 
Other surveys lit up that corner slightly more. Thus, a poll commissioned by the 
governmental Department for Interethnic Relations in October November 2006 and 
conducted by the ”Max Weber” College of Professional Sociology in collaboration 
the the Center for Research on Interethnic Relations and titled ”National Minorities 
in Romania. Representations, Intolerance, Discrimination” found out that 7.2% of 
respondents ”fully” and 8% ”partly” agreed that ”All Jews in Romania should move 
to Israel”1. This is significantly higher than the 4% or less who, according to the three 
surveys discussed in the last section, were ready to state that Jews should not live in 
Romania or visit it, though lower than those who held the same view of Hungarians 
(11% in full agreement and 11.9% partly agreeing)2.
Even more significant, the poll conducted by the ”Max Weber” College repeated 
several questions first used in a survey conducted some three years earlier by Gallup 
Romania3, thus making possible again a longitudinal comparison that turned out to be 
of high relevance for latent antisemitic inclinations. Table 7 sums up these findings.
1  Guvernul României. Departamentul pentru Relaţii Interetnice. Secretar de Stat, 
”Material pentru presă. Lansarea studiului de cercetare ’Climat interetnic în România în 
pargul integrării europene’”, Bucureşti, 4 decembrie 2006, p. 2. The survey was conducted 
on a representative sample of 1 170 persons aged 18 and more and had a margin of error of 
± 2.9%. The probabilistic sample was stratified according to type of residence (rural vs. urban), 
residence size, residential administrative status, region and proportion of national minorities in 
local political representation according to the 2002 census.
2  No findings were reported for the Romani minority, but 6.2% fully and 8.5% partly 
agreed with the statement that ”People of nationalities other than Romanian should leave 
Romania” and 24.6% (12.3% each) backed the statement that ”Romanians should not mix with 
other nations”. 
3  Cf. Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Intoleranţă, discriminare şi autoritarism...cit.
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Table 7
Antisemitic Attitudes 2003, 2006.
To what extent do you agree with the following statements on Jews?
2003
n=1,500
2006
n=1,170
Agreement % DK, NA% Agreement % DK, NA%
The emigration 
of Jews should 
be encouraged
18.0 23.0 19.1 8.5
Jews destabilize 
societies they 
live in
11.0 32.0 13.0 14.7
Jews exaggerate 
the persecutions 
they were 
subjected to in 
order to obtain 
advantages
27.0 32.0 31.5 17.9
Jewish interests 
in our country 
are most often 
different from 
other citizen’s 
interests
31.6 35.0
24.0
18.6
Genuine 
Christians 
should have 
nothing to do 
with Jews
14.4 9.2 12.0 21.0
Jews have too 
much influence 
in our country
14.0 35.0 17.0 16.5
International 
politics and 
finances are 
controlled by 
Jews
23.0 21.4 31.5 43.0
Jews backed 
the communist 
takeover
15.0 29.4 20.0 52.0
Jews cannot be 
forgiven for the 
sin of Christ’s 
crucifixion
27.0 15.6 29.0 37.0
The suffering 
of the Jewish 
people is God’s 
punishment
36.0 35.0 33.5 17.8
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Perhaps the most important finding of Table 7 rests in the sharp drop in 
respondents who in 2006 no longer opt out of replying to the question ”To what extent 
do you agree with the following statements on Jews?”. While in 2003 a majority of 
53% did so, in 2006 three in five respondents (62%) are ready to express an opinion1. 
Interestingly, religion-based ”deicidal justifications”2 are the only exception to this 
pattern (37% no answers to the ”unforgivable sin”), but this is compensated by the 
drop in the partly related absence of answers supporting the ”God’s punishment” 
version, that (for reasons mentioned below) might be related to the debates on the 
Holocaust. The same connection might explain the moderate increase (from 27 to 31.5 
percent) in the proportion of those backing the statement that ”Jews exaggerate the 
persecutions they were subjected to in order to obtain advantages” and the significant 
drop in those no longer opt out of answering this question.
What I am trying to suggest is that, paradoxically, the publication of the findings of 
the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania in 20053 and the setting up 
of the INSHREW in line with the commission’s recommendations triggered reactions 
of opposite nature than that pursued: contributing to awareness of the role played by 
Romania in the Holocaust and acceptance of the current generation’s responsibility 
(to distinguish from culpability or guilt) for those events.
Part of the 2003-2006 findings were in fact party reconfirmed by the INSHREW 
itself its 2007 survey:
Table 7a
Antisemitic Attitudes 20074
Now in reference to Jews, to what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements?
n = 1,026 Fully agree%
Partly agree
%
Somewhat
Disagree
%
Fully 
Disagree
%
I cannot 
appreciate
%
It would be 
better if they 
went to live in 
their country
9 12 19 22 37
They pursue 
only their inte-
rests, even if 
harming others
7 12 19 17 45
1  Guvernul României. Departamentul pentru Relaţii Interetnice. Secretar de Stat, ”Material 
pentru presă...cit.”, p. 4.
2  On the Deicide as a form of deflecting the responsibility for the Holocaust on the Jews 
themselves see Michael SHAFIR, Between Denial and ”Comparative Trivialization”. Holocaust 
Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe, The Vidal Sasoon International Center for 
the Study of Antisemitism. ACTA no. 19, Jerusalem, 2002, pp. 38-39.
3  International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, Final Report, eds. Tuvia Frilling, 
Radu Ioanid, Mihai E. Ionescu, Polirom, Iaşi, 2005. 
4  Institutul Naţional pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România ”Elie Wiesel”, Sondaj 
de opinie, cit., p. 24. The poll was carried out by TNS CSOP between 25 April and 3 May 2007 on 
a sample of 1 026 and had a margin of error of ±3.06%.
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They backed 
the communist 
takeover
4 8 13 20 55
They act to 
destabilize 
societies thy 
live in
2 7 19 31 41
On those questions belonging to the same ”family”, Tables 7 and 7a, seem to 
confirm each other at a distance of one year. The proportion of those who would 
rather see a Romania cleansed of its Jews reaches by 2007 one in five respondents, 
but no less significantly, the ”opting out” choice is fourfold that of 2006, becoming 
by far the first choice. More than half of the sample opts out on the ”backing the 
communist takeover” choice and nearly half of the respondents do the same on the 
other two questions. One is forced to conclude that attitudes toward Jews are still 
hard to measure.
That this indeed is so is illustrated by Table 7b, showing references to Jews in 
what questionnaire designers and analysts considered to be positive terms in the 
same 2007 survey:
Table 7b1
Positive Perceptions of Jews, 2007
Now in reference to Jews, to what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements?
n=1,026 Fully agree
%
Partly agree
%
Somewhat
disagree
%
Fully
disagree
%
I cannot 
appreciate
%
They are a 
minority 
maintaining 
good relations 
with the rest of 
the population
18 39 8 4 32
They have 
many 
important 
personalities in 
different fields
23 33 5 4 35
They have a lot 
of international 
influence 27 27 6 5 35
They are an 
important 
minority for 
Romania
12 31 10 13 34
1  Ibidem, p. 23.
573
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XII • no. 4 • 2012
Political Antisemitism in Romania? 
They represent 
a community 
furthering 
the country’s 
progress
14 28 11 7 41
In this case too, large pluralities ranging from one-third to two-fifths of the sample 
would not pronounce themselves. More importantly perhaps, is having ”a lot of 
international influence” really a ”positive” reference? Is it really essentially different 
from the 2003-2006 surveys’ ”International politics and finances are controlled by 
Jews”? The ”Max Weber” College survey showed that every third Romanian believes 
in conspiracy theories – an increase of a significant ten percent from 2003, when ”only” 
23% inclined to be the partisan of such fallacies. The domination of international 
finance markets by Jews can be considered to be the modern age’s version of the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion which, as sociologist Horváth István of the ”Max 
Weber” Institute pointed out, responds to the need of the layman to receive ”simple, 
coherent explanations” rather than ”rational, complex and abstract” explanations to a 
situation where ”capitalism’s dynamics brings about rapid changes to which people 
adapt with great difficulty”. In such situations, ”simplifying the causes” of the change 
through ”the personification of evil by finger-pointing to occult groups with religious 
or other intent” becomes an attractive option1.
Romanian sociologist George Voicu, who authored a tome on ”conspirationism” 
in postcommunist Romania2 saw a direct linkage between the INSHREW ”tongue 
in cheek” declarations of Romanian officials concerning the Holocaust after being 
pressed by the West to do so as a condition to accessing NATO3 and later the European 
Union, and their conviction that ”Jews dominate the world”4.
Holocaust Awareness
Optional classes on the Holocaust were introduced in the national high-school 
curriculae as a mandatory subject (2-4 hours) in the larger framework of World War 
II history (which is being taught in the 7th, 10th, 11th and 12th grade) as early as 1998, 
by former Education Minister Andrei Marga. The first textbooks to include the topic 
were published in 1999 but many of them included wrong or even biased information, 
most of the times in a clear attempt to exonerate the Romanian authorities from any 
responsibility for their wartime wrongdoings. Things, however, seemed to change 
for the better after the Final Report of the International Commission for the Study of 
the Holocaust in Romania, whose findings became the country’s ”official position” 
1  Victor BORZA, ”Fiecare al treilea român crede în teoriile conspiraţioniste”, Cotidianul, 
5 February 2007.
2  George VOICU, Zeii cei răi. Cultura conspiraţiei în România postcomunistă, Polirom, Iaşi, 
2000.
3  For details see Michael SHAFIR, ”Memory, Memorials and Membership: Romanian 
Utilitarian Antisemitism and Marshal Antonescu”, in Henry F. CAREY (ed.), Romania Since 
1989: Politics, Culture and Society, MD, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2004, pp. 67-96.
4  Victor BORZA, ”Fiecare al treilea român…cit.”.
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on the Romanian chapter of the Holocaust. Thus, with few exceptions, the textbooks 
published after 2004 are generally more coherent and accurate than before1.
Apparently having in mind precisely the purpose of finding out how these 
developments impacted high-school students that the 2007 survey initiated by the 
INSHREW stepped out of line, including in its sample people aged 15 and over, 
rather than the habitual age groups of 18 and over. The experiment has not been 
repeated since, which makes longitudinal comparison more difficult rather than 
facilitating it. Four surveys conducted between 2007 and 2011-12 included a question 
that requested respondents to state whether or not they had heard of the Holocaust. 
As Table 8 shows awareness seems to have increased in 2010 (but then tended to slide 
back again) due to the debates launched after the publication of the International 
Commission on the Holocaust in Romania report and the setting up of the INSHREW, 
reaching a peak in 2010.
Table 8
Have you heard about the Holocaust?
2007
n=1,026
%
2009
n=1,201
%
2010
n=1,400
%
2011-12
n=1,400
%
Yes 65 69 72 68
No 27 24 23 29
DK, NA 8 7 5 3
Sources: Institutul Naţional pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România ”Elie Wiesel”, 
Sondaj de opinie, cit.; INSOMAR, Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării în 
România, Fenomenul discriminării în România. Percepţii şi atitudini, CNCD, Bucureşti, August 
2009; TOTEM, Institutul Naţional pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România ”Elie Wiesel”, 
Fenomenul discriminării în România, 2010; TNS CSOP, CNCD, Raport de cercetare, 2012.
That is also illustrated in the findings of Table 9, where, regardless of the simplicity 
or complexity of answers or their accuracy, a longitudinal increasing awareness of the 
phenomenon combines with a decreasing drop in the proportion of no answers. The 
question was asked of all respondents who said they had heared of the Holocaust. 
Table 9
Please tell me what the term Holocaust means
(multiple choice)
2007
%
2009
%
2010
%
2011-12
%
The extermination of 
Jews by the Germans 54.0 61.2 66.0 76.0
The persecution of 
European Jews 14.0 18.5 20.0 30.0
1  See Felicia WALDMAN, Michael SHAFIR, ”Jewish Studies in Romania”, Modern Jewish 
Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, March 2011, p. 80.
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Mass crimes/killings/
pogroms   8.0 11.0 22.0 30.0
The deportation of Jews   7.0  9.0 21.0 36.0
The punishment 
of Jews in Nazi 
concentration camps
  5.0  3.0 26.0 31.0
Concentration camps   3.0  2.1 20.0 35.0
The organized persecu-
tions of one nation   3.0  4.0 15.0 18.0
A disaster   3.0  4.9 14.0 25.0
Something bad for 
mankind   2.0  6.0 12.0 19.0
Mass gasing   2.0  1.1 20.0 30.0
The persecution of 
Gypsies (Roma)   2.0  0.4   5.0 12.0
The attitude of 
Germany towards Jews   1.0  1.9 11.0 19.0
Other answers < 1%  5.0 - - -
DK, NA 15.0 15.4  6.0   2.0
Two additional findings emerge from this table: first, there is still relatively 
little awarness among Romanian respondents of the Porriamos (the Roma genocide), 
and this must be read in connection with the large anti-Roma prejudice. Indeed, in 
2003, Gallup Romania found out that 25% of the respondents to a survey based on 
a representative sample of 1 500 persons aged 18 and over believed Romania did 
not participate in the Porriamos, 22% said it participated in it and the majority (53%) 
simply did not know or did not care to answer the question1. Second, there is a strong 
tendency to blame the Holocaust on the Germans alone.
Indeed, respondents who answered that they had heard about the Holocaust were 
then requested to state where it had been perpetrated. This question was important in 
view of numerous attempts to deflect the perpetration of the crimes on Germany alone 
and particularly in view of what I have termed as ”selective negationism”, by which 
is meant the attempt to present one’s own country as an exception among Germany’s 
allies in the Second World War2. In spite of having passed in 2002 a governmental 
ordinance forbidding the negation of the Holocaust that (after long procrastination) 
became law in 20063, Romanian officials and historians have repeatedly claimed that 
no Holocaust has taken place on Romanian territory and prosecutors often refuse to 
heed complaints about the law’s infringement on grounds that the law does not refer 
to Romania but to Germany alone.
1  Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Intoleranţă, discriminare şi autoritarism…cit., p. 41.
2  Michael SHAFIR, Between Denial and ”Comparative Trivialization”…cit., pp. 52-59.
3  Monitorul Oficial al României, no. 377, 3 May 2006.
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Table 10
Taking into consideration that the term Holocaust means the systematic state-organized 
extermination of Jews by Nazi Germany and its allies and collaborators between 
1933-1945, do you believe that this happened in... (multiple choice)
2007
%
2009
%
2010
%
2011-12
%
Romania 28 32 49 46
Other European 
countries 39 42 79 56
Germany 66 73 52 75
DK, NA 27 21 10  8
As Table 10 demonstrates, between half and three-quarters of Holocaust-aware 
respondents still believe Germany alone has been involved in the perpetration of 
the Holocaust (leaving aside the unfamiliarity with the geography of the Shoah) 
and only between one-quarter and one-half are conscious of their own country’s 
involvement in the crimes’ perpetration. Remarkably, ethnic Hungarian respondents 
(for obvious reasons) are by far more aware of the fact that the Shoah had been 
perpetrated in countries other than Germany. More than half of them (52%) said 
in 2007 the atrocities took place in other European countries as well, significantly 
higher than the average1.
Respondents who in the 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011-12 surveys said a Holocaust 
had taken place in Romania were further requested to specify what the Shoah in their 
country had consisted of. In 2007 and 2009 they had the possibility of opting from a 
handed list, whereas in the latter two surveys they could either approve or reject the 
mentioned options.
Table 11
What did the Holocaust in Romania consist of?
(multiple choice)
2007 2009 2010 2011-12
% %
Yes
%
No
%
DK
%
Yes
%
No
%
DK
%
The deporta-
tion of Jews 
to isolated 
places or other 
countries
74 77.3 75 9 16 74 11 15
Mass deten-
tions of Jews 67 68.8 71 11 16 67 14 19
1  Institutul Naţional pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România ”Elie Wiesel”, Sondaj 
de opinie, cit., p. 35. No data available for other years.
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Expropriation 
of goods and 
the forced 
evacuation of
dwellings
62 64.8 67 11 22 68 12 20
Persecutions 
and limita-
tions of Jewish 
rights
55 61.2 66 13 21 63 16 21
The systematic 
extermination 
of Jews
49 45.1 58 18 23 51 26 23
Mass execu-
tions of Jews 
(pogroms)
26 28.1 57 19 24 47 28 25
DK 4 4.9 - - - - - -
Options for the latter two entries seem to indicate that  large segments among the 
respondents have still difficulty in acknowledging that their country has participated 
in the perpetration of the worst attrocities against its Jewish minority. Except for 
respondents to the 2010 sample, these segments never become majorities on both 
counts. However, threre is clearly a significant increase in the proportion of those 
who, due to the International Commission’s report, the debates in the media in its 
wake and the activity of the INSHREW, are now ready to acknowledge the existence 
of mass executions and of pogroms. Three in four respondents, moreover, mention 
the deportations (although it remains unclear whether those carried out by German 
and Hungarian authorities in northern Transylvania or those implemented by the 
Romanian authorities to Transnistria) and roughly two in three refer to other forms 
of persecutions. Yet one should never loose sight of the fact that these answers are not 
representative of the population as a whole, but rather of the one-quarter to one-half 
of those aware of their country’s participation in the Holocaust.
Does that mean that these respondents are ready to acknowlege Romania’s 
responsibility for those events? Respondents to the four surveys who acknowledged 
the fact that a Holocaust had been perpetrated in Romania among other places 
were asked who, in their opinion, should be held responsible for it. Findings are 
summarized in Table 12.
Table 12
In your opinion, who was responsible for the outbreak of the Holocaust in Romania?
2007
%
2009
%
2010
%
2011-12
%
V.large 
extent
%
Large 
extent
%
Little 
extent
%
V. little 
extent 
%
DK, 
NA
%
V.large 
extent
%
Large 
extent
%
Little 
extent
%
V. little 
extent 
%
DK, 
NA
%
Nazi 
Germany 90 91.7 67 17 2 1 13 69 17 2 1 11
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The 
Antonescu 
govern-
ment
47 51.8 16 23 19 14 28 17 26 20 12 25
The USSR 11 9.1 6 12 18 25 39 11 19 17 22 31
The Jews 4 2.1 2 6 12 50 31 3 5 13 49 29
The 
Romanian 
people
2 3.9 2 8 16 41 33 3 5 23 41 28
Others 1 0.5 - - - - - - - - - -
DK, NA 8 5.5 - - - - - - - - - -
While attributing responsability for the Holocaust in Romania to Nazi Germany 
is close to unanimous, at most half of the respondents to this question opinionate 
(”very large” and ”large” extent) that the country’s wartime government should also 
share it. Only one in ten Romanians or less is willing to accept responsibility as a 
member of the Romanian nation for the country’s wartime persecution of its Jewish 
minority.
There is a strong likelihood of a corelation between the post-communist Antonescu 
personality cult1 and the above findings. The impact of that cult has been measured 
several times before. A poll conducted by IRSOP in April 1995 established that 62% 
of respondents had ”a good opinion” on Antonescu, 24% a ”bad opinion”, with 14% 
replying that they did not know. The poll attempted to establish how Romanians 
were viewing the Second World War and Antonescu was the only leader of the times 
who scored positively among those mentioned2. Asked to pick up the Romanian 
leader who best served Romania’s interests (a făcut cel mai mare bine) in the last one 
hundred years in a survey carried out by CURS in November 19993 and by Gallup 
Romania in October 20074, however, only 4% selected Marshal Antonescu in 1999 and 
2% in 2007; conversely, only 2% picked him as the leader who worst served Romania 
in the last century in 1999 and 3% in 2007. On both instances, communist dictator 
1  See Michael SHAFIR, ”Marshal Antonescu’s Postcommunist Rehabilitation: Cui Bono?”, in 
Randolph L. BRAHAM (ed.), The Destruction of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews during the Antonescu 
Era, The Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies Graduate Center/The City University of New 
York and Social Science Monographs. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York and 
Boulder, 1997, pp. 349-410 and IDEM, ”Memory, Memorials and Membership…cit.”.
2  The poll was conducted between 21-30 April 1995 on a representative sample of 1 198 
respondent aged 18 and over randomly selected from 78 rural and urban settlements and had 
a margin of error of ± 2.8%. Results for other Second World War leaders were as follows: Good 
opinion – Hitler 2%, Mussolini 5%, Stalin 5%, Churchill 26%, Roosevelt 31%. Bad opinion – 
Hitler 90%, Mussolini 68%, Stalin 87%, Churchill 38%, Roosevelt 31%. See ”Ce cred românii 
despre al Doilea Război Mondial”, Adevărul, 9 May 1995.
3  Survey conducted between 14-27 November 1999 on a representative sample of 2 019 
persons, with a margin of error of ±2%. See ”Emil Constantinescu – pe un preţios loc doi, după 
Nicolae Ceauşescu”, Adevărul, 17 November 1999.
4  Survey conducted between 10-22 October 2007 on a representative probabilistic sample 
of 2 000 persons aged 18 and more with stratification according to historical region and size of 
settlement. Margin of error ± 2.2%. See Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea COMŞA, Dumitru SANDU, 
Manuela STĂNCULESCU, Barometrul de Opinie Publică Octombrie 2007–BOP 1998-2007, Fundaţia 
Soros România, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 5.
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Nicolae Ceauşescu distantly headed the lists on both accounts1. Yet in 2006, when 
Romanian Television organized a popular show based on models earlier tested in the 
several European countries as well as Canada and South Africa where people where 
asked to pick up (phoning in, by SMS or letters) the ”ten greatest Romanians”, Ion 
Antonescu was not only among the ”finalists” (on second place) but placed sixth in 
the final round2. Such shows, of course, are not scientific polls, and critical voices were 
quick to point that out, the more so as suspicion lingered of possible manipulation 
on Ceauşescu, apparently ”pushed out” to 11th place to avoid having him among 
finalists3. But neither can such instances be dismissed as wholly lacking in relevance. 
Antonescu’s presence among the final contenders, the daily România liberă wrote, 
”reflects the continuing lag-behind of Romanian political culture and the failure 
of a large part of the population to assume responsibility for the past. This 
failure includes the role played by Romania in the Holocaust, although under 
the pressure of Romania’s efforts to access the EU, official efforts to assume 
responsibility for the past have been noticed in the last years. Under Antonescu’s 
regime massacres and deportations of Jews have been carried out, especially 
in Romania-occupied Transnistria, and the government legislated antisemitic 
laws on the model of those in force in Hitler’s Germany. The Antonescu cult 
has been a phenomenon of the 1990s, when post-1989 political leaders exploited 
Antonescu’s resistance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as part and parcel of the effort 
to cultivate nationalism in order to deflect attention from the fact that political 
and economic power had remained unchanged”4.
Perhaps just as important is the fact that numerous public opinion polls indicated 
that in the context of ”transition’s hardships” combined with deprivation and 
notorious corruption, segments of the population are prone to incline for a strong 
leader, indeed even for a dictatorship of one kind or another. As soon after the 
change of regime as 1991, a public opinion poll carried out by the Bucharest-based 
Independent Center for Social Studies and Polling (CISSS) led by sociologist Pavel 
Câmpeanu (better known in the West under the pseudonym Felipe Garcia Casals) 
found that 10.5% of those questioned would prefer a military government to that in 
power5. Twenty-two percent were of that opinion by 2003, 8% of whom saying that 
it would be ”very good” for Romania to have such a regime and 14% that it would 
be ”good”, according to a Gallup Romania poll. The same survey found that 13% 
believed it would be ”very good” for Romania to have a single political party and 20 
percent that it would be ”good”. In other words, by 2003 one in three respondents was 
disaffected with democracy6. 
1  Twenty-two percent in 1999, 23% in 2007 as the country’s best leader; twenty-two percent 
in 1999, 24% in 2007 as its worst leader in the last one hundred years. Gabriel BĂDESCU, Mircea 
COMŞA, Dumitru SANDU, Manuela STĂNCULESCU, Barometrul…cit., p. 46.
2  See ”Liderii au avut priză la votanţi”, Evenimentul zilei, 10 July 2006; ”Topul ’celor mai 
mari români’ reflectă o societate dezorientată şi confuză”, România liberă, 3 November 2006.
3  Marius VASILEANU, ”Circul marilor români”, Adevărul, 11 July 2006.
4  ”Topul ’celor mai mari români’...cit.”.
5  Pavel CÂMPEANU, ”Politica internă (Opinia publică despre instituţii şi actori)”, Revista 
22, no. 16, 26 April 1991. No details on sample.
6  Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Intoleranţă, discriminare şi autoritarism…cit., p. 30.
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A poll conducted by IRSOP in February 1993 found that 27% of the respondents 
would opt for ”strong-fist authoritarian leadership”1. There can be little doubt that 
Ion Antonescu would easily fit into those shoes. According to a Gallup International 
poll, by end 1994 more than one in four Romanians (28%) believed that the best option 
for the country was to ”have a strong-fist leadership, even if that means limiting 
democracy”, and an even larger segment of one-in-three (32%) was ready to ”solve 
the criminality problem” by ”restricting citizens’ rights for some time”; ten percent of 
those questioned in this poll said the situation would improve if Parliament would be 
done away with and 11% were of the opinion that political parties should be abolished 
in order for the situation to get better2. In 1995 and 1996, in IMAS-conducted surveys, 
about one-half of ethnic Romanian questioned (52.2% and 49.9%, respectively), ”fully 
agreed” with the statement that ”submission to authority is the best thing children can 
learn”. Partial agreement was expressed by 19.6% in 1995 and 32.6 percent in 19963. 
According to the Gallup Romania poll of 2003, 35% were in full or partial agreement 
with the statement that ”obedience and respect of authority are the best things 
children should learn” and precisely the same proportion of respondents believed 
that ”Respect for public order is more important than respect of individual rights”4. 
By November 1998, according to a poll conducted by Metro Media Transilvania, no 
less than three in four Romanians believed that it would be better for the country to 
have at its head ”a single determined person rather than several people with different 
ideas”5. Finally, a Gallup Romania survery conducted in November 2005 found that 
two in three respondents (66%) would like to see at the helm ”a strong leader, who 
does not waste his time with Parliament and elections”6.
Inclinations toward authoritarianism are even more pronounced among 
Romania’s rural population (some 45% of the country’s total population). If at 
national level 66% of Romanians might opt for ”a strong leader, who does not waste 
his time with Parliament and elections”, among those who dwell in the countryside 
three out of four respondents (74%) do so, according to a Eurobarometer-type survey 
commissioned at the end of 2005 by the Soros Foundation Romania and conducted by 
Metro Media Transilvania7. Other options scoring high among this category are non-
party experts (72%), high Chruch prelates (65%) and military leaders (62%).
1  Libertatea, 16-17 March 1993. Poll based on face-to-face interviews with a sample of 1 100 
aged 18 and over. Margin of error ± 3%.
2  ”Ultimul sondaj Gallup chestionează cetăţenii asupra desfiinţării partidelor”, România 
liberă, 5 January 1995. Poll carried out between 7-10 December 1994 on a sample of 1 294 
respondents aged 18 and more. Margin of error ± 3%.
3  Results by curtesy of IMAS. No details on 1995 sample. The 1996 sample was of 1 582 
persons (see Ralu FILIP, „Relaţiile româno-maghiare: Românii se simt mai străini în propria lor 
ţară decât maghiarii”, Curierul naţional, 13 April 1996). Nearly one in four ethnic Hungarians 
”fully agreed” with the statement in 1995, but in 1996 support had almost doubled (46.3%). In 
partial agreement were in 1995 32.3% of ethnic Hungarians and in 1996 24.8%.
4  Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Intoleranţă, discriminare şi autoritarism…cit., p. 30.
5  Mediafax and Reuters, 26 November 1998, Associated Press, 27 November 2008. The 
poll was conducted on a sample of 1 253 persons, and had a margin of error of ± 3%. 
6  Mircea MARIAN, ”Farmecul discret al dictaturii”, Adevărul, 24 November 2005. No 
details on sample.
7  The survey was carried out between 22 November-6 December 2005 on a representative 
sample of 1 516 residents of rural areas and had a margin of error of ±. See Rompres 27 January 
2006.
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Bearing in mind these aspects, how is the Marshal viewed by the minority of 
respondents (an aspect that should never be overlooked) aware of Romania’s 
participation in the Holocaust? The four surveys commissioned or carried out by the 
INSHREW provide a mixed picture. In the first survey, all 1 026 respondents were 
asked to choose from a list ascribing to the Marshal six positive and five negative 
descriptions. 
Table 13
Marshal Antonescu was Romania’s leader between 1940-1944. I shall read 
out a number of statesmanship attributes and ask you to tell me how well 
they suit this historical figure (2007)
Fully 
suitable
%
Suitable 
to a great 
extent
%
Not too 
suitable
%
Not 
suitable 
at all
%
I cannot 
appreciate
%
He was a great 
patriot 20 26 8 5 41
He was a great 
strategist 19 25 7 4 45
He must be 
rehabilitated 
for what he did 
for Romania
12 21 10 8 49
He was a 
democratic 
leader
8 16 18 10 49
He created 
Greater 
Romania
7 15 12 15 51
He was a 
savior of Jews 5 10 14 17 54
He is 
responsible for 
crimes against 
the Roma/
Gypsies
12 21 9 9 49
He was a 
dictator 8 20 14 10 48
He is 
responsible for 
crimes against 
the Jews
8 17 11 12 52
He led 
Romania to 
disaster
6 13 16 16 50
He was a war 
criminal 6 12 15 17 50
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From very large pluralities of between 41 and 49 percent to small majorities 
ranging from 50 to 54 percent Romanian respondents seem non-committal to the 
symbolic figure of the Marshal. Whether this is due to choice for keeping away 
from ”delicate” subjects or genuine lack of information there is no way of telling. 
The roughly half of sample who opts for expressing an opinion seems to be divided, 
but the wartime leaders’ partisans display more certainty. Ion Antonescu as a ”great 
patriot” and a ”great strategist” had been the subject of popular movies (for example 
Sergiu Nicolaescu’s The mirror, 1993) and alleged historical documentaries such 
as Felicia Cernăianu’s 1996 Marshal Ion Antonescu’s Destiny1. The market has been 
saturated with books by historians ranging from apologetic to simply hagiographic2, 
some of which would make even Nicolae Ceauşescu blush. And, of course, there 
has been a pronounced negationist effort, denying involvement in crimes against 
Jews or attempting to deflect the responsibility for the atrocities on subordinates, on 
Jewish ”provocations” and even transforming the marshal into a savior of Jews3. The 
poll conducted in 2007 seemed to indicate that success in the latter effort was rather 
limited – not more than 15% of those questioned opted for that description. Notably, 
however, one-third of the sample backs the attempts to bring about Antonescu’s 
judicial rehabilitation. These attempts started in 19924 and were still ongoing at the 
time the poll was conducted. As for his having been a ”democratic leader” or for 
having ”created” Greater Romania (he was still a young, though important member 
of the General Staff during the First World War at whose end Greater Romania came 
into being) – these are responses showing that ignorance never dies.
In the remaining three polls, the same question was posed only to those who had 
replied that Romania had participated in the Holocaust. In other words, the query 
was addressed to those who were more informed that the rest. Would they have a 
different image of the Marshal? Findings are summarized in Table 13a, in which the 
two opposing pairs have been joined into one.
1  See http://filmeromanestivechi.myforum.ro/-vp68.html, acessed on October 10, 2010 
and http://www.trilulilu.ro/video-cultura/destinul-maresalului-ion-antonescu-documentar, 
acessed on February 2, 2012.
2  Some of these are mentioned in International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, 
Final Report. 
3  For a partial reviewing see Michael SHAFIR, ”Romania’s Tortuous Road to Facing 
Collaboration”, in Roni STAUBER (ed.), Collaboration with the Nazis. Public Discourse after the 
Holocaust, Routledge and Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Antisemitism 
and Racism, London, New York, Tel Aviv, 2011, pp. 256-260. 
4  In the last such attempt, Şerban Alexianu, son of Transnistria’s governor under 
Romanian occupation, failed to bring about his father’s judicial rehabilitation and implicitly 
that of Antonescu and the members of his government sentenced to death or prison terms. 
The High Court of Cassation and Justice on 6 May 2008 annulled a lower court’s decision of 
5 December 2006 to acquit the marshal, Iron Guard leader Horia Sima and 19 members of 
the Antonescu cabinet of war crimes. Alexianu Jr. had claimed that the 1946 sentencing of 
Antonescu, his father Gheorghe Alexianu and others should be annulled because the offences 
had been triggered by the USSR’s annexation of Bessarabia in 1940 and the People’s Tribunal 
who pronounced the sentence in 1946 had not taken into consideration the secret protocols of 
the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. See Mediafax, 6 May 2008; A.G., ”Reabilitare respinsă”, 
Ziua, and CAB, ”Reabilitarea numelui mareşalului Antonescu respinsă de ICCJ”, România 
liberă, both of 7 May 2008.
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Table 13a
Marshal Antonescu was Romania’s leader between 1940-1944. I shall read out a number 
of statesmanship attributes and ask you to tell me how well they suit this historical figure 
(2009-2011-12)
2009 2010 2011-12
Suitable
%
Unsui-
table
%
Cannot 
appre-
ciate
%
Suitable
%
Unsui-
table
%
Cannot 
appre-
ciate
%
Suitable
%
Unsui-
table
%
Cannot 
appre-
ciate
%
Great 
patriot 43 19 38 44 18 37 46 18 36
Great 
strategist 41 19 41 43 16 41 39 21 40
Must be 
rehabi-
litated
32 30 38 25 25 50 26 25 49
Demo-
cratic 
leader
18 37 45 8 36 56 13 36 51
Created 
Greater
Romania
20 34 46 11 37 52 16 35 49
Savior of 
Jews 13 34 53 3 42 55 10 41 49
Respon-
sible 
crimes ag. 
Roma
39 17 44 30 25 45 34 23 43
Dictator 29 29 42 23 33 44 28 30 42
Respon-
sible 
crimes ag. 
Jews
28 22 50 25 29 46 26 31 43
Led 
Romania 
to disaster 22 38 50 12 39 49 17 37 46
War 
criminal 22 29 42 17 34 49 20 34 46
In view of the fact these answers were provided by the informed segment of 
respondents, there is little ground for comfort. To put it otherwise: out of the roughly 
half of the total sample who in 2010 and 2011-12 acknowledged the Holocaust had 
been perpetrated in their country, between 36 and 56 percent (over one in three to 
one-half of respondents) chose not to pronounce themselves on Antonescu’s good or 
bad attributes as a statesman. 
Compared to 2007, when all respondents answered this question, and the 
remaining three surveys where only those informed were faced with it, one notes 
some surge in the awareness of the Holocaust having affected the Roma population, 
yet at most two out of five respondents fit into this category. There is also a slight 
surge in the awareness of Antonescu’s crimes against Jews, but this raise is even 
584
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XII • no. 4 • 2012
MICHAEL SHAFIR
smaller, affecting at most one in four respondents. On Antonescu’s having been a 
dictator there is practically stagnation, accompanied by a significant decline in those 
who view him as having led Romania to disaster. One also notes fluctuations in those 
opting for seeing the former Conducător (Führer) as a war criminal, yet the proportion 
of those who do so is never higher than one in five respondents.
Antonescu as a ”great patriot’ or a ”great strategist” are also stagnant over 
time, but these are clearly the most favored choices, opted for by some two in five 
respondents or even higher. The drive for his rehabilitation looses ground from one in 
three to one in four respondents, and there are significant drops at in the ”ignorant” 
answers (democratic leader and forger of Greater Romania). Notably, the Marshal’s 
apologists do less well in his depiction as an alleged savior of Jews; the choice here 
declines to as little as 3% in 2010, though some ground is regained in 2011-12 (10%).
Altogether and despite some progress in the post-2005 years, the Holocaust 
remains a subject that interests only superficially (if at all) the Romanians. Out of the 
1 026 respondents to the 2007 survey, only 1% said they were ”very much interested 
in the problem of the Holocaust” and an additional 5% claimed they were ”interested 
much”. Twenty-there were ”neither much, nor little interested” and 15% acknowledged 
their interest was ”little”. Two respondents in five (39%) admitted their interest in the 
problem was ”very little”. Twenty-two percent of the respondents to the same survey 
were aware that Romania has a national Holocaust Commemoration Day, but 71% 
were unaware of it and 7% could not answer the question. Even among those aware 
of the day’s existence, only 10 respondents were able to mention correctly the date 
(9 October, when the first deportations of Jews started in Bukovina in 1941)1. Only a 
minority among Romanians are aware of the Holocaust’s having been perpetrated in 
Romania and the Marshal Antonescu is predominantly viewed as a positive figure 
of the country’s history or at least as one in whose political record the ”good side” 
overshadows the ”bad side”. 
Political Antisemitism
As András Kovács has pointed out, ”while anti-Jewish prejudice is an important 
factor to be considered in any society, it is more likely to be a prerequisite and 
indicator of the dynamic of antisemitism rather than its cause”. To become politically 
consequential, the process entails ”the combined effects of several internal and 
external factors, only one of which is anti-Jewish prejudice”. The transformation of 
overt of covert ”societal moods” into politically relevant actors 
”gathers momentum if, in societies where anti-Jewish prejudices have been 
present more or less continuously, a ’culture’ and a language arises that makes 
use of opinions, myths, and phantasmagorias ’about Jews’ to interpret situations 
that are unrelated to Jews or the role of Jews in society”2.
1  Institutul Naţional pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România ”Elie Wiesel”, Sondaj 
de opinie, cit., p. 39. The questions were not included in subsequent surveys, which makes 
longitudinal comparison impossible.
2  András KOVÁCS, The Stranger at Hand...cit., p. x.
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The surveys hitherto presented leave little doubt that such elements are indeed 
present in Romanian political culture. To what extent might they at one point lead to 
the politicization of antisemitism in postcommunist Romania as was the case of the 
emergence of Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary) as a xenophobic antisemitic 
and anti-Roma force in Hungary (16.67% in the 2010 elections, thus becoming the 
third largest force in the legislature1) is more than a pertinent question.
Available data on Romania is, alas, too scarce to match the Hungarian sociologist’s 
impressive performance, as indeed are the skills of this article’s author. In what 
follows, analysis is mainly qualitative, though whenever possible is supported by 
quan titative support.
Back in 2008, I wrote2 that if antisemitism in postcommunist East Central Europe 
may be said to be a dependent variable (i.e. what needs to be explained), an examination 
of the reasons for its relatively successful post-communist dissemination is bound to 
reveal a variety of independent variables (what explains a phenomenon) in the postures 
of the different movements, associations and political parties displaying major or less 
obvious anti-Semitic nuances. These might be driven by different, indeed sometimes 
contradictory attitudes towards the past (the legacy of the interwar radical right), 
present (the legacy of communism) and future (orientations towards the ”well 
ordered” society). They may be political and/or cultural foes, and the fact that they 
find themselves in the same boat, disturbing as it might be for the local remnants of the 
Jewish communities, should not make one jump to the conclusion that the rationality 
of this state of affairs is to be sought in the simplistic blind, ancestral hatred of what 
Alain Finkielkraut and later Andrei Oişteanu in Romania called the ”imaginary Jew”3. 
That article distinguished between the following taxonomic categories of ”producers” 
of antisemitism: a) ”Self-exculpatory nostalgic antisemitism” or what I have called in 
the past parties and movements of a ”radical return” to models of inter-war radical 
right; b) ”Self-propelling antisemitism”, or what I have called in the past parties and 
movements of a ”radical continuity” based on models provided by exacerbated national 
communism4; c) ”Neo-populist mercantile antisemitism”, in which antisemitism is 
utilized or shed away as a function of perceptions of what ”sells” and what not at 
both national and international level; d) ”Utilitarian anti-Semitism”, which shares 
some characteristics with the former category but is nonetheless distinguished from 
it by the fact that it is employed by parties, movements and personalities who are on 
record for being ”anti-antisemitic”; e) ”Reactive antisemitism”, basically explained 
in terms of the ”competitive martirology” between the Holocaust and the Gulag; 
f) ”Vengeance antisemitism” represented by that category driven by the simple hatred 
of Jews for whatever they do or refrain from doing. Of these, categories a) to e) are 
1  At the 2009 elections for the European Parliament, Jobbik managed to elect three depu-
ties out of the 22 alloted to Hungary.
2  Michael SHAFIR, ”Rotten Apples, Bitter Pears: An Updated Motivational Typology of 
Romania’s Radical Right Anti-Semitic Postures in Post-Communism”, Journal for the Study of 
Religions and Ideologies, vol. 21, no. 7, Winter 2008, pp. 149-187, http://jsri.ro/ojs/index.php/
jsri/article/view/381. In what follows I make extensive use of that article.
3  Alain FINKIELKRAUT, Le Juif imaginaire, Seuil, Paris, 1980; Andrei OIŞTEANU, Imaginea 
evreului în cultura română. Studiu despre imagologie în context Est-Central European, Humanitas, 
Bucureşti, 2001.
4  Michael SHAFIR, ”Reds, Pinks, Blacks and Blues. Radical Politics in Post-Communist East 
Central Europe”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. I, no. 2, 2001, pp. 397-446.
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particularly relevant for scrutinizing political antisemitism. Category f) is less relevant, 
since it appears that everywhere in East Central Europe (and perhaps not only) there 
would be a number of individuals who simply and incurably hate Jews. 
The ”nostalgic” attribute is warranted by the fact that the category looks upon 
the interwar authoritarian past as a model for solving the transitional problems of the 
present and constructing the country’s future. ”Nostalgia” should therefore not be 
comprehended as mere contemplation, I was then emphasizing. It involves activism, 
at both grassroots and at central political level. The members of the category are by 
and large either very old or very young, with the middle-age bracket being thinly 
represented, though not wholly absent. Exiled personalities linked with the wartime 
regimes, many of whom established abroad associations, as well as people freed from 
communist prisons after long years of detention, are thus bridging a gap of generations 
with young would-be political leaders whose education under communism carefully 
avoided to address their own nation participation in, and responsibility for, the 
atrocities committed against Jews in that period. This is what Shari J. Cohen called 
”state-organized forgetting”1.
These political (and ”cultural”!) formations would be the Romanian penchant 
of Jobbik. But none of them ever made it to Parliament or was even close to making 
it. Among them one can mention the (now deceased) Movement for Romania led 
by Marian Munteanu, which was set up in 1992, Radu Sorescu’s Party of National 
Right, set up in 1993, and the neo-Iron Guardist Everything for the Fatherland Party 
(Totul pentru Patrie), set up in 1993 and which in 2011 decided to take off its mask and 
restore the formation’s interwar name, Everything for the Country (Totul pentru ţară). 
Coriolan Baciu leads the latter party, but its first leader was Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu, 
an Iron Guardist who was a member of the armed anti-communist resistance in the 
mountains and who died in. As Romanian legislation prohibits the existence of fascist 
parties, following the name change the Prosecutor General’s Office has launched 
action for its outlawing2. More recently (1 March 2012), a new formation calling 
itself and having among its members the foremost Holocaust negationist Ion Coja, 
announced its drive to be registered as a political party, the National List (for which it 
needs the endorsement of 25 000 supporters residing in at least 18 out of the country’s 
41 counties).
These movements – and a plethora of associations established either in 
connection with them or independently, such as the Manu Foundation – have all had 
their successors, the most recent of which is an organization calling itself the New 
Right (Noua Dreaptă) Group, led by the young Tudor Ionescu and whose leadership 
is entirely made up by people in their twenties. Also in this category belongs the 
Iron Guard splinter movement led by Şerban Suru. Publications such as Permanenţe, 
Obiectiv legionar, Puncte cardinale, Noua dreaptă, and others display an unconcealed 
identification with exculpatory nostalgic antisemitism, while other publications, such 
as Rost or Jurnalul literar barely display the fig of distancing themselves from what is 
taken to be the ”non-emblematic” excesses of some political and cultural figures of 
the past. In most cases, however, an apologist explanation accompanies the distance 
1  Shari J. COHEN, Politics without a Past. The Absence of History in Postcommunist Nationalism, 
Duke University Press, Durham, 1999, pp. 85-118.
2  Cristi CIUPERCĂ, ”Parchetul cere dizolvarea partidului legionarilor”, România liberă, 
22 July 2012.
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taking. Enough, nevertheless, to provide justification for meritorious intellectuals of 
center-right political persuasion to lend their prestige by regularly contributing to 
such publications and thereby legitimize antisemitism and extremism. Even if yet ”in 
the bud”, one is reminded of Kovács’s explicit warning that: 
”If, in addition to the antisemites, other people who feel no personal 
antipathy toward Jews are inclined to use the vocabulary of this language for 
debating changes, conflicts, decisions, and existential issues, and if antisemitic 
arguments become, for such people, a considerable, though not necessarily 
acceptable, explanation of different events, then the various forms of anti-Jewish 
hostility can indeed constitute an explosive mix”1.
According to the daily Curentul of 6 February 2007, some 28 radical-right 
organizations were active in Romania under one guise or another, as well as 12 
foundations and associations set up by supporters of the Iron Guard. The daily cited 
information reportedly included in the Romanian Intelligence Service’s report for 
June 1998-June 1999. Several major themes dominate the political discourse of this 
category. First among them is Holocaust denial, followed by related conspiracy-
theories in which Jews play either the single or the main part (in conjunction with 
other ethnic minorities) and the (also related) theme of the Jewish guilt for having 
created, nurtured and imposed communism on the world in general and on one’s 
own country in particular.
There is very little hard data regarding attitudes vis-à-vis the renaissance of 
the Iron Guard. In a survey conducted by IRSOP between7-14 December 1994, only 
5% of respondents said they considered the ”renewed appearance of the Legionary 
Movement” to be ”a good thing”, 75% replied that it was ”a bad thing” and 20% 
said it ”has no importance”2 (the Legionary Movement was the original name of the 
organization at its set up in 1927). In the 2003 poll conducted by Gallup Romania 
the 30% of the sample’s total (456 out of 1 500) who replied that political and other 
extremist organizations exist in Romania (20% said ”no” and 50% that they did not 
know or did not answer), only 3% percent mentioned among them the Legionary 
Movement3. Finally, in the 2006 Romanian TV show on the ”greatest Romanians”, 
Legionary Movement founder Corneliu Zelea Codreanu placed twenty-second, far 
higher than such interwar democratic leaders such as Iuliu Maniu (32nd)4.
As for self-propelling antisemitism, parties that make up this category are the 
parties of ”radical continuity”5. There are either personal or ideological links (or both) 
between these parties and the communist past. These formations exacerbate the implicit 
antisemitism inherited from the former regime and transform it into an explicit one. 
The transformation is not accidental but intentional. Antisemitism, for the members of 
this category, is instrumental, serving mobilization purposes. The purpose no longer 
is (as in the case of the nostalgics) to merely cleanse the past, but to prepare the future. 
1  András KOVÁCS, The Stranger at Hand...cit., p. x.
2  Libertatea, 23 December 1994. Poll based on a sample of 1 305 persons aged 18 and over 
randomly selected from 83 rural and urban settlements and weighted in line with National 
Statistics Institute data. Margin of error ± 2.8%.
3  Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Intoleranţă, discriminare şi autoritarism…cit., p. 49.
4  ”Topul ’celor mai mari români’...cit.”.
5  Michael SHAFIR, ”Reds, Pinks, Blacks and Blues…cit.”.
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The authoritarian legacy comes to play here an important role. The instrumentality of 
antisemitism consequently consists in providing potential electorates with ”models” 
that rule out their political adversaries’ alternative democratic constructs.
Like the nostalgic anti-Semites, self-propelling anti-Semites indulge in the 
”Judaization” of political adversaries, but unlike them the exercise is aimed at the 
effective rather than at the affective aspect of politics. The past is important for the 
self-propelling anti-Semites, but its importance derives from its instrumentality. In 
other words, self-propelling antisemitism needs the ”generic Jew” and, unlike self-
exculpatory antisemitism, cares in fact little about the ”really existing” Jew. For self-
propelling anti-Semites the ”genetic Jew” must become a ”generic Jew”, for in a 
situation where the physical Jewish presence is extremely reduced, the mobilization 
force of antisemitism would otherwise suffer. It is in this sense that Zygmunt Bauman 
observes that in post-communist Poland the term ”Jew” has started being applied 
to anything disagreeable and has lost its real-reference to the Jews as a separate 
ethno-religious group1. Yet it must be added that the generic sense has not, however, 
eliminated the genetic one, which continues to be instrumentalized regardless of its 
numerical and above all sociological insignificance
Self-propelling antisemites ”propose” alternative models to democracy, though 
they are usually careful to do so implicitly rather than explicitly. With democracy 
being viewed as a foreign implant aimed at establishing world Jewish power, 
”patriotic” figures of the recent past are resurrected and their rehabilitation is pursued 
with tenacity. Marshal Ion Antonescu serves this purpose in Romania. The post-
communist political party that best fits this category is the Greater Romania Party 
(PRM). That the generic Jew is instrumental for no other purpose than power-seeking 
was demonstrated in the PRM’s case by the ease with which antisemitism was briefly 
abandoned shortly before the 2004 elections, when party chairman Corneliu Vadim 
Tudor’s electoral campaign was managed by an Israeli spin doctor, and by its re-
emergence as a central feature of party mass-appeal once that EU-eying recipe proved 
inefficient at the polls. I ought to add that this does not make Tudor and his party 
mere electoral anti-Semites. The party leader’s hate of Jews can be documented well 
back into the communist era2.
Both nostalgic and self-propelling anti-Semites engage in self-victimization and 
in the externalization of guilt. They both seek to present either their own group or 
the Romanian nation as a whole as being the victim, rather than the perpetrator and 
to attribute whatever black spots may have existed to other internal and/or external 
forces. They share with nostalgic anti-Semites the generic Jew in the role of the 
internal enemy, sometime along other national minorities such as the Hungarians, 
just as they share with them Russia and revisionist Horthyate Hungary as one of 
the outlets for the externalization of guilt. Yet while some self-propelling nationalists 
such as Tudor occasionally distance themselves from the Iron Guard (though freely 
print its propaganda in the publications they disseminate, the daily Tricolorul and the 
weekly România mare), other self-propelling nationalists, such as historian Gheorghe 
1  Cited in Ilya PRIZEL, ”Jedwabne: Will the Right Questions Be Asked?”, East European 
Politics and Societies, no. 1, 2002, p. 289.
2  See Michael SHAFIR, ”The Men of the Archangel Revisited: Anti-Semitic Formations 
among Communist Romania’s Intellectuals”, Studies in Comparative Communism, no. 3, 1983, 
pp. 223-243; IDEM, ”From Eminescu to Goga via Corneliu Vadim Tudor: A New Round of 
Antisemitism in Romanian Cultural Life”, Soviet Jewish Affairs, no. 3, 1984, pp. 3-14.
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Buzatu, collaborate with the nostalgics in the Iron Guard cleansing operation. Where 
Buzatu would, however, stop, is at the point repeatedly emphasized by the nostalgics 
that they were victims of both Marshal Antonescu and the communist regime. 
There is an important difference between nostalgic and self-propelling anti-
Semites insofar as memory is concerned. The former are still engaged in a battle for 
their past’s rehabilitation. Therefore they tend to restrict the debate, or at least to focus 
it, on the role played by their predecessors in Romanian history, rarely venturing 
to more general venues. Self-propelling anti-Semites, on the other hand, extend the 
battle to national dimensions. Whereas both categories engage in Holocaust denial, 
the latter tend to be paradoxically more emphatic than the former, as they perceive 
participation in the Holocaust as a national affront. While both categories claim that 
Romanian participation in the Holocaust is an invention of the ”occult,” self-propelling 
anti-Semites bring in the dimension of the present more often than nostalgic anti-
Semites do. For them, accusations concerning Romania’s participation in the genocide 
against the Jews are primarily aimed at enslaving Romanians through the cultivation 
of unwarranted guilt feelings and taking over local assets by way of no less unjustified 
compensation demands. Unlike nostalgic antisemites, who would often question the 
Holocaust in totality, self-propelling antisemites are ”selective” Holocaust deniers 
(see supra). Former PRM vice-chairman Buzatu, who is also a former vice-chair of the 
Romanian Senate, is the most prominent representative of this trend. 
The PRM was set up as a political party in May 1991 and first participated in 
elections in late September 1992, managing to garner a modest 3.89% (16 seats) in 
the vote cast for the Chamber of Deputies and 3.85 percent (six seats) of those for 
the upper house (the Senate). In 1996 its performance was not much better: 4.45% 
(19 seats) in the lower house and 4.54 percent (eight seats) in the upper chamber. 
Running as a presidential candidate the same year, Tudor scored an unimpressive 
4.72%. The PRM’s fortunes seemed to have taken off four years later. Not only did 
Tudor make it to a runoff with Ion Iliescu (which, however, he lost 33.17 vs. 66.83 
percent), but his formation became the second largest force in the legislature, with 
84 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 37 senators. About one in five Romanians 
(19.48% of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies, 21.01% of senatorial votes) had cast 
their ballot for the PRM. The scrutiny was above all an expression of the disaffection 
with the performance of the center-right (CDR) of Romania, which had won the 1996 
elections. Tudor did his best to cast himself in the role of the ”righteous” (justiţiar) 
champion of the struggle against corruption, the PRM leader was able to capture for 
himself and his party that segment of the ”fluctuating electorate” that had neither 
forgotten nor forgiven the social democrats for their own pre-1996 spoilage of the 
country’s assets. He was also advantaged of the fact that the extreme nationalist 
Romanian Transylvanian no longer had an alternative after the disintegration (for all 
practical purposes) of the Party of Romanian National Unity1. In 2004 the party had 
lost considerably in support, garnering 13.63% of the vote for the Senate and 12.93% of 
that for the lower house; in the presidential elections that year Tudor no longer made 
it to the runoff, coming in third with support from only 12.57% of the voters. These 
represented the PRM’s hard core of former regime securitate who (unlike many of their 
1  Michael SHAFIR, ”The Greater Romania Party and the 2000 Elections in Romania: 
How Obvious Is the Obvious?”, The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics, vol. 2, no. 1, 2001, 
pp. 91-126.
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peers) had not managed to join the ranks of the new managerial class, transition losers 
and poorly educated former officials who had owed their advantageous privileges to 
ideological criteria. The year 2004 might have marked the PRM’s swan song as well. 
The party no longer made in to Parliament in 2008, while in the presidential elections 
of 2009 Tudor came in a poor fourth, being supported by just 5.56% of voters1. This 
was to a lager extent the result of a change in the electoral system that did away with 
proportional representation. Running jointly with ”mercantile antisemite” George 
(Gigi) Becali in the 2009 elections for the European Parliament when a proportional 
system was again used, Tudor’s list secured three seats on that body2.
This is somewhat ironical, since one of the reasons for the decline of popularity of 
the PRM is to be found precisely in its being (rightly) depicted by political adversaries 
as anti-European, extremist and xenophobic at a time when all polls were indicating 
strong support for joining the EU. Shortly after its set up, in a poll conducted by 
Câmpeanu’s CISSS in 1995, Tudor was easily identified as an ”extremist” leader by 
no less than 30% of the respondents, which was higher than even those identifying 
the PRM as ”extremist”. On second place, however, was the Democratic Union of 
Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), which again is ironical, as Tudor repeatedly (and 
wrongly) strived to depict this ethnic formation3. Another survey carried out by Metro 
Media Transilvania in 1998 found that the PRM (and the center-right Democratic 
Convention of Romania) were considered to be the most ”patriotic”, but at the same 
time Tudor’s formation and the UDMR were viewed as being the most ”extremist”4. 
The 2003 Gallup Romania poll mentioned above reconfirmed the PRM’s perception 
as ”extremist”, with almost half (49%) of the 456 respondents who said in Romania 
there existed extremist party identifying the PRM as such; but again, the UDMR 
placed second (20 percent). Finally, respondents to the 2007 survey supervised by 
the INSHREW were asked whether in their opinion Romania had political ”parties 
or formations that have an antisemitic message”. Expectedly, more than half of the 
sample (56%) said they did not know. Only 16% gave an affirmative answer and 
28% replied in the negative. The 167 respondents (out of 1026) who said such parties 
existed were then asked to identify them. Eighty-four percent named the PRM, six 
percent the UDMR, four percent the New Generation Party (PNG), six percent named 
other formations and 12 percent did not respond5. It might be then concluded that 
the extremist, xenophobic and antisemitic identity of the PRM was not an unknown 
factor, but neither was it an element that bothered the public at large. The decline of 
1  Results of 1992-2004 elections in Stan STOICA, Dicţionarul partidelor politice din România 
1989-2004, Editura Meronia, Bucureşti, 2004, pp. 150-171. For the presidential elections of 2009 
cf. Rezultate oficiale finale BEC: Alegeri prezidenţiale 2009-Turul I, http://www.tashy.ro/
rezultate-oficiale-finale-bec-alegeri-prezidentiale-2009-–-turul-i/, accessed on November 25, 2009.
2  ”Rezultate oficiale euroalegeri 2009: PSD+PC - 11 mandate, PD-L-10, PNL-5, UDMR-3, 
PRM-3, EBA-1”, EurActiv.ro, http://www.euractiv.ro/uniunea-europeana/articles|displayArticle/
articleID_17441/Rezultate-oficiale-euroalegeri-2009-PSD+PC-11-mandate-PD-L-10-PNL-5-UDMR-
3-PRM-3-EBA-1.html, accessed on June 10, 2009.
3  Pavel CÂMPEANU, ”Extremismul în trei viziuni”, Revista 22, no. 45, 8-14 November 
1995. The poll was based on a sample of 1 134 respondents aged 18 and above from 64 rural and 
urban localities and the Bucharest Municipality. No margin of error specified.
4  Mediafax, 26 November 1998. No details available on the poll’s structure.
5  Institutul Naţional pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România ”Elie Wiesel”, Sondaj 
de opinie, cit., p. 17.
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the party is not to be attributed to these factors, but rather to the anxiety that Romania 
might end isolated in Europe.
But what is the PNG? The leader of the PNG, Becali, is a good example of what 
might be called an ”instinctive” neo-populist politician seeking to gain power from 
below by whatever possible means. His model appears to be former Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Like Berlusconi, he is a highly successful businessman 
and Romania’s second-richest man, with an estimated fortune of $2.8–3.0 billion, 
according to the Bucharest daily Ziua of 27 November 2007. Like the Italian, he owns 
the country’s most popular soccer team – in Becali’s case, Steaua Bucharest. Unlike 
Berlusconi, however, Becali lacks any formal education, and, again, unlike him, he is 
on record occasionally uttering anti-Semitic statements.
Born in June 1958, Becali decided to enter politics in 2003. He did so by becoming 
president of a phantom party, established in January 2000 by former Bucharest Mayor 
Viorel Lis, who had resigned from the PNG after failing to gain representation on the 
Bucharest Municipal City Council. Becali simply bought the party from Lis, thereby 
sparing himself the trouble of registering a new political formation. Hence his barely 
concealed conviction that whatever he lacks in education or political experience can 
be bought for cash. And he may be right. Becali displays in his frequent television 
appearances a primitive vocabulary, all too often full of invectives directed at his 
critics, which would normally turn him into what the Germans call ”salonunfähig”. 
But Romania is no Germany. Considered by many TV moderators to be an audience-
attracting clown, Becali in early 2007 was for some time one of the most interviewed 
political personalities, which undoubtedly contributed to his seemingly unstoppable 
climb in opinion polls.
Professing to be a devout Christian, Becali engages in incontestable charities, 
claiming he has been picked by God to become rich in order to help the poor and save 
Romania from its current travails. In 2005, for example, he financed the construction 
of homes for those affected by floods and promptly showed up in a Bucharest slum 
in 2006 paying the electricity bill of residents who were threatening to turn the town 
into rubble after their supply had been cut off. Becali seemed to pick up the vote of the 
disoriented and the disillusioned, whose numbers run into hundreds of thousands. 
While in the 2004 elections he barely received 1.77% of the vote and the PNG received 
2.36%, failing to gain parliamentary representation1, by 2007 polls showed him to be 
the country’s second most popular politician and his party third in party preferences. 
This turnaround occurred against the background of the mutual annihilation of 
Romania’s parliamentary parties and the deadlock in the confrontation between 
them and President Traian Băsescu. Yet the PNG did not make it to Parliament in the 
elections of 2008, and running for president in 2009 Becali scored a poor 1.85%2.
Alongside the Army, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been consistently 
shown in public opinion polls to be the country’s most popular institution. Back in 
1  Mediafax, 1 December 2004.
2  Cristian PĂTRĂŞCONIU, ”Ce mai poate impune ’dictatorul’ Băsescu?”, Cotidianul, 
2 April 2007, http://www.cotidianul.ro/editorial_ce_mai_poate_impune_dictatorul_basescu-
24211.htm, accessed April 2, 2007; Răzvan Mihai VINTILESCU, ”Cucul Tăriceanu”, Cotidianul, 
2 April 2007, http://www.cotidianul.ro/cucul_tariceanu-24207.html, accessed on April 2, 2007; 
”Rezultate alegeri: Băsescu şi Geoană merg în turul doi”, Ziare.com, http://www.ziare.com/
basescu/stiri-traian-basescu/rezultate-alegeri-basescu-si-geoana-merg-in-turul-doi-scorul-
este-foarte-strans-video-955752, accessed on November 23, 2009.
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2004, Becali, who is also the most generous magnate financing the construction of 
Romanian Orthodox churches, said he was ready to help any religious organization 
except the Jews; the latter allegedly had successfully infiltrated Romanian politics 
and did not need his help1. On several occasions, Becali has awarded prizes to high-
school pupils in contests for reciting prayers. By 2007, ahead of a cancelled visit to 
Israel, he was denying any discrimination, claiming he was ready to engage in charity 
for Jews in Romania and Israel as well. Like many other of his country’s politicians, 
he had become convinced in the meantime that Jews could do and undo everything 
anywhere – including the Romanian presidential elections. He also denied on that 
occasion any trace of antisemitism, claiming that it would run against his devout 
Christian beliefs to hate Jews2. Furthermore, apparently aiming at gaining some votes 
from Jews of Romanian origin in Israel ahead of the November 2007 elections for the 
European Parliament, PNG Secretary General Cătălin Dâncu, made a great effort in 
an interview with a Romanian-language Israeli daily to deny any links between Becali 
and Iron-Guard sympathizers3. 
Yet back in 2004, Becali had called on the OTV private television for the 
canonization of Iron Guard ”Captain” Codreanu4 and on 28 August 2004 he said on 
television that ”the Legionary Movement has been the most beautiful movement in 
this country [incorporating] the country’s entire elite, [such as] priests, university 
professors and students”5. On 25 May 2008, in an interview with the German daily 
Der Tagesspiegel, the PNG leader acknowledged that his father had been an Iron 
Guardist, and he would ”always be my model”. I would ”never deny my origins”, he 
emphasized. Still, ”the Legionnaires were no extremist, but a religious movement”, 
he said. When journalist Keno Verseck reminded him of the Iron Guardist anti-Jewish 
pogroms, Becali countered:
”Where did you fish that story? The Romanians are not a people who 
commit crimes. Do you know why? Look around, in neighboring countries, in 
the whole Eastern world. Romania is the bravest and the quietest of them all. 
There is no crime and no mafia here. We are not a people of criminals. When I 
watch those movies with the Jews, I cannot believe that Romanians, my people, 
did such things. Never! The Romanians are simply not capable of that. This is 
why I do not believe that a Holocaust has ever taken place in Romania”6.
1  Michael SHAFIR, ”Profile: Gigi Becali”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 December 
2004, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1056373.html, accessed on December 13, 2004.
2  Al. NICHITA, „Ziua premiată la Tel Aviv”, Ziua, 2 May 2007, http://www.ziua.net/ 
display.php?data=2007-05-02&id=219913, accessed on May 2, 2007.
3  ”La ora actuală nu există în partidul lui George Becali nici un fel de persoană care să poată 
să mai reprezinte un pericol pentru relaţia cu Israelul şi cu israelieni de origine română. Prima 
parte a interviului cu av. Cătălin Dâncu, secretar general al formaţiunii politice româneşti Partidul 
Noua Generaţie-Creştin Democrat şi candidat pentru postul de deputat europarlamentar”. 
Interviu realizat de Nando Mario Varga, Viaţa noastră (Tel Aviv), 16 November 2007.
4  Michael SHAFIR, ”Profile: Gigi Becali”, cit.
5  Radu Călin CRISTEA, ”Trei personaje în căutarea altei poveşti”, Ziua, 12 November 2004, 
http://www.ziua.net/display.php?data=2004-11-12&id=162281&kword=Becali, accessed on 
November 12, 2004.
6  Keno VERSECK, ”Gigi Becali: Die Scafe haben mich stark gemacht”, Der Tagesspiegel, 
25 May 2008, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/zeitung/Sonntag;art2566,2536698, accessed on 
May 25 2008.
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Having hired political scientist Dan Pavel as a consultant in March 2003, Becali 
began employing the political discourse of the interwar fascist Iron Guard. Pavel, 
who used to be a specialist in, and a prominent opponent to, Iron Guard renaissance, 
never addressed this issue. He simply confessed that as Becali’s consultant he would 
make more money than he would have made in 10 years as a university professor. 
Becali first came out with the slogan ”Everything for the Country” (as mentioned 
above, at one point this was the Iron Guards’ name of their political party), then he 
promised to ”make Romania into a country like the holy sun in the sky”. The words 
were taken almost literally from a famous Iron Guardist song and were based on a 
letter addressed by ”martyr” Ion Moţa to fascist leader Codreanu shortly before Moţa 
died fighting on Franco’s side in Spain in 1937. After the 2004 elections, Pavel cut his 
ties with Becali, claiming the PNG was becoming a ”fascist party”, having co-opted 
several members of the New Right Group, apparently at the suggestion of Ion Coja. 
Coja is a leading figure in both Holocaust denial and attempts to rehabilitate the Iron 
Guard. In my earlier work, I depicted him as the emblematic figure of ”vengeance 
antisemitism”.
When the list of PNG candidates for the 2007 European Parliament elections was 
released, it included ”historian” Alex Mihai Stoenescu and former PRM parliamentary 
deputy Vlad Hogea. Both are notorious anti-Semites and Holocaust deniers and/or 
trivializers with Hogea being also on record for racist positions targeting the Roma. In 
a collection of articles published in 2001, he was praising an infamous Nazi ideologist, 
exclaiming: 
”[The] time has come for the nations to liberate themselves from the chains 
of Jewish slavery, lest it be too late! How right was Julius Streicher (tortured 
and killed by the Occult for his courage): ’He who fights against the Jews, fights 
against the devil!’”.
Incitement on deicidal grounds was not missing from the volume either:
”Many ask themselves why the heads of the Judaic Occult are so revengeful 
and so acquisitive. The key of the problem is likely to be found in the killing 
of the Redeemer by the Jews. Unable to liberate themselves from the sin lying 
heavy on their shoulders for 2000 years, the Jewish-Khazar anti-Christs have been 
trying to break their spiritual inferiority complex by fully animalizing their affective 
experiences”1.
Finally, Hogea cited approvingly crowds shouting anti-Roma slogans at soccer 
games and calling for wartime dictator Ion Antonescu to take care of ”a million 
crows” in his old proven way2.
In a multi-volume book entitled Istoria loviturilor de stat în România, Stoenescu 
tells his readers that at its starting days, the Legionary Movement was by no means 
antisemitic. ”Captain” Corneliu Zelea Codreanu ”was not born as an anti-Semite, but 
as an anti-communist leader”. It became so, however, when it realized that the many 
Jews who at that time attended Romanian universities were leftists and thus carriers of 
1  Vlad HOGEA, Naţionalistul, Editura Crater, Iaşi, 2002, p. 44. Author’s emphasis.
2  Ibidem, p. 25.
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the Bolshevik threat1. Even so, Stoenescu claims, it is wrong to describe the Movement 
as Right wing just because of its antisemitism, and it is particularly wrong for Jews to 
do that, because ”once you explain the position of the Legionary Movement as Right 
wing, by implication you find yourself in the position of having stated that the Jews 
were Left wing, thus provoking a Right-wing antisemitic reaction”2. For Stoenescu, 
whatever Jews do is unavoidably wrong. Those who worked in the media are ”the first 
who should be held responsible for the instauration of hatred between Romanians and 
Jews”. They had for years claimed they were fighting for political, rather than racial 
rights, but when their political adversaries, dressed up in Iron Guard uniforms and 
carrying pistols, set up to hunt them, they started shouting that they were Jews and 
the reason for their persecution was antisemitism, not anti-communism, he writes. 
Whereas in the past they had distanced themselves from their rabbis, they became 
Jews again overnight. Many of them later took refuge in the Soviet Union, ”only to 
return riding its tanks as victors”3.
In any case, there had been no reason for them to seek refuge. The Legionary 
”Death Squads”, according to Stoenescu, ”were not set up as groups of assassins, 
organized to eliminate political adversaries”. Only communist propaganda portrayed 
them so. They had been set up ”on the principle of self- sacrifice, being formed by 
legionnaires willing to risk their life; hence their uninspired name”. These were people 
ready to die, ”not to bring death on others. This is a fundamental distinction”. The 
Legion, Stoenescu tells his readers, has been persecuted by all regimes and its image 
distorted by all alike. That persecution ”continues even today, in 2002”4.
In December 2012, Becali ran in the parliamentary elections as a candidate 
of the PNL, a formation allied for that scrutiny with the Socialist Party. He won a 
seat in Bucharest by a huge majority. Becali thus managed to turn that center-left 
alliance into one that can be now viewed as belonging to the ”utilitarian antisemitic” 
category. ”Utilitarian antisemitism” refers to the occasional exploitation of antisemitic 
prejudice for the needs of the hour by politicians who, by and large, are probably not 
antisemitic. Utilitarian antisemitism is by no means a distinguishing feature of the 
post-communist world. It is no less spread in Western countries. It is not as much 
what utilitarian antisemites say that counts, as is what they refrain from saying. In 
other words, the political discourse of utilitarian antisemites is implicit rather than 
explicit. It is also quite often a coded discourse, never going all the way of the self-
exculpatory nostalgics or the self-propelling antisemites, but ”signaling” to those able 
to encode the discourse its unmistakable intention. Failure to distance oneself from 
antisemitic views in the hope of enlisting the support of those who are obviously 
prejudiced, or even forging political alliances with them, can be just as telling as 
is embracing their view openly. That such political alliances are shortsighted and, 
more often than not, turn against the utilitarian antisemites themselves, is altogether 
another matter. But it is one that brings to fore the singularly present orientation of 
utilitarian antisemites, who seem to believe that what counts is only what serves the 
need of the hour, and that the future can always be dealt with starting from scratch. 
1  Alex Mihai STOENESCU, Istoria loviturilor de stat din România, vol. 2, RAO International 
Publishing Company, Bucureşti, 2002, pp. 415-416.
2  Ibidem, p. 422.
3  Ibidem, pp. 423-424.
4  IDEM, Istoria loviturilor de stat din România, vol. 3, RAO International Publishing 
Company, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 142.
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It is therefore not surprising to find the political discourse of utilitarian antisemites to 
be self-contradictory in a longer time perspective.
Utilitarian antisemitism is to be found at both the Left and the Right ends of the 
”mainstream” post-communist political spectrum. This is not a surprise either, since 
neither the Left nor the Right ends of that spectrum are oblivious to the dangers of 
being painted by more extremist political adversaries as lacking roots in the country’s 
past or culture. Utilitarian memory fine-tunes itself to that of the exculpatory nostalgics 
and particularly to that of the self-propelling antisemites for being potential political 
allies. Former Romania President Ion Iliescu is such a utilitarian politician. During his 
1992-1996 mandate, Iliescu was ready to forge an informal, and later even a formal 
coalition with the radical continuity formations of the PRM, PUNR, and Socialist 
Labor Party, all of which displayed antisemitism, though the PUNR combined that 
feature with a pronounced anti-Hungarianism and the PSM added to both a more 
open endorsement of Leftist postures. That coalition was not void of tension, Iliescu 
being among other things reproached with having allegedly acquiesced in Romania’s 
”culpabilization” for the Holocaust when he visited the Choral Temple in Bucharest in 
1993, and (later) on the occasion of a visit paid at the United States Holocaust Museum in 
Washington. Running again for the office, which he temporarily lost to President Emil 
Constantinescu in 1996, on 12 October 2000, in an interview with the daily Adevărul, 
Iliescu was keen to point to the electorate that he had valiantly defended Romania’s 
historical record. His detractors, he said, had blown out of any proportion the fact that 
he had covered his head in a gesture of politeness towards his hosts, but no one had 
remarked the difference between himself and Polish President Lech Walesa. Unlike 
Walesa, when visiting the Israeli Knesset he had refrained from apologizing for his 
countrymen’s participation in the Holocaust, the former and future president was 
keen to stress. The issue, he said, was one that still required elucidation by historians. 
Unlike Iliescu, during his term of office Constantinescu had acknowledged Romanian 
responsibility for the ”genocide” perpetrated against Jews, even if at the same time 
insisting on his country’s refusal to deliver its Jews to Hitler1.
In a speech at the Choral Temple in Bucharest marking the sixtieth anniversary 
of the Iron Guard pogrom in Bucharest on 21 January 2001, Iliescu, now re-elected 
president, said the Iron Guardist ”aberration” had been a ”delirium of intolerance 
and antisemitism”. Yet, he added, except for that brief ”delirium”, there had been no 
Romanian contribution to ”the long European history” of persecution of the Jews, and 
it was ”significant” that there was ”no Romanian word for pogrom”. Furthermore, he 
hastened to add, it was ”unjustified to attribute to Romania an artificially inflated 
number of Jewish victims for the sake of media impact”. Romania’s distorted image, 
according to Iliescu, was likely to be corrected when ”Romanian [read rather than 
Jewish] historians will tackle the subject”2.
The setting-up of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania has 
its own peculiar saga. It followed an Iliescu blunder in an interview with a journalist 
from the Israeli daily Ha’aretz published on 25 July 2003. Engaging in Holocaust 
trivialization, the former president told the interviewer that ”[T]he Holocaust was not 
unique to the Jewish population in Europe. Many others, including Poles, died in the 
same way”. But only Jews and Roma, the interviewer observed in reaction, had been 
1  Realitatea evreiască, 16 April-15 May 1997.
2  RFE/RL Newsline, 22 January 2001.
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”targeted for genocide” at that time. To which Iliescu responded: ”I know. But there 
were others, who were labeled communists, and they were similarly victimized. My 
father was a communist activist and he was sent to a camp. He died at the age of 44, 
less than a year after he returned”. Although Iliescu admitted that massacres of Jews 
had been perpetrated on Romania’s territory proper, and observed that ”the leaders 
of that time are responsible for those event”, he insisted that 
”[i]t is impossible to accuse the Romanian people and the Romanian society 
of this. When Germany declared [sic!] the Final Solution – a decision that was 
obeyed by other countries, including Hungary, Antonescu no longer supported 
that policy. On the contrary, he took steps to protect the Jews. That, too, is 
historical truth”.
He also went on to observe: 
”Antonescu also had his positive side. In 1944, when Hungary under 
Horthy was implementing the Final Solution and transported its Jews, including 
residents of northern Transylvania, which was then under Hungarian rule, to 
death camps, Antonescu was no longer doing that”.
In an attempt to hush the international scandal created by the interview, 
the president proposed the setting up of what became known as the Elie Wiesel 
commission, after the name of its chairman.
He was not the last social democrat to have to swallow his words on the Holocaust. 
On 30 March 2012, young PSD Senator Dan Şova, appearing on the private TV Money 
Channel, said no Jew has suffered ”on Romania’s territory” and this was Antonescu’s 
merit. As source, he quoted a book by Jewish journalist Teşu Solomovici, who likes 
to pose as historian. He was sanctioned by the new leader of his party, Victor Ponta, 
who suspended him from the position of SPD spokesperson and sent him off to 
Washington D.C., to document himself at the United States Holocaust Museum. But 
sanctions stopped there and upon return Şova retook his previous function, after 
having expressed regrets for his earlier pronouncements. Meanwhile, two ONGs, 
the Center for Monitoring and Combatting Antisemitism and the Roma association 
Romani Criss launched an official penal complaint against Şova. Like most such 
complaints, the Romanian justice system shelved it1.
At this point it is necessary to emphasize that such perceptions of Antonescu’s 
role are not widespread in Romania, indeed they cross party lines. At the initiative 
of historian and National Salvation Front (FSN) – the predecessor of the PSD – 
parliamentary deputy Petre Ţurlea in 1991, on the eve of the 45th anniversary marking 
Antonescu’s June 1946 execution, Parliament raised in a minute of silence tribute 
to his memory2. The Front was the first name of what today is known as the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD). Screen director Sergiu Nicolaescu, who directed the movie 
1  Cf. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tbmakPZ-Xeo, accessed on March 8, 2012; 
”Plângere penală împotriva lui Dan Şova privind afirmaţiile despre Holocaust”, HotNews.ro, 
http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-11689683-plangere-penala-impotriva-lui-dan-sova-
privind-afirmatiile-despre-holocaust.htm, accessed on March 7, 2012.
2  Monitorul Oficial al României, 31 May 1991.
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on Antonescu mentioned above, belonged to the same political camp. But things were 
not much different at the other side of Romania’s post-communist political spectrum. 
If in 1991 it was the then-ruling FSN that initiated the tribute paid by Parliament 
to Antonescu’s memory, eight years later, under the ruling of a coalition formed by 
the CDR it was the turn of National Peasant Party Christian Democratic (PNŢCD) 
Senator Ion Moisin to (unsuccessfully) propose that the upper house approve a 
resolution describing Antonescu as ”a great Romanian patriot, who fought for his 
country till his death”. Presenting the resolution (also backed by Nicolaescu in a rare 
display of consensual political non-partisanship in the Romanian legislature), Moisin 
denied Antonescu bore any responsibility for the Holocaust, claiming that ”on the 
contrary, he saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Jews, refusing to carry out 
Adolf Hitler’s order to send them to Germany [sic!]”1. As early as 1990, Moisin’s 
fellow PNŢCD senator, Valentin Gabrielescu told Romanian-born German journalist 
William Totok that the marshal had been one of Romania’s ”great statesmen”. Under 
Antonescu, he said, Romanian Jews had suffered ”considerably less than in Hungary 
or Poland” and historic accounts claiming otherwise were nothing but ”fairy tales”. 
In fact, Jews had been privileged when compared to the Romanian majority, for while 
”Romanian soldiers were fighting on the Volga, the Jews stayed home and were only 
obliged to clean the capital’s streets of snow”2. 
The National Liberal Party (PNL), which alongside the PNŢCD initially belonged 
to the CDR, has a particularly long post-1989 record in support of Antonescu’s 
rehabilitation drive. One of the most emphatic spokesmen for this cause among 
parliamen tarians representing the party, was Dan Amedeo Lăzărescu, who also 
claimed to be a historian. In 2001, shortly before his death, Lăzărescu was revealed 
to have been a securitate informant, most likely recruited while in prison. In the first 
(1990-1992) legislature he spoke in Parliament several times in praise of Antonescu and 
seemed to have never changed his mind. By 1997, in an article published in România 
liberă’s weekly supplement Aldine, Lăzărescu was writing that the Romanian people 
”cannot comprehend the absurd pretensions of some [Jewish or Jewish-
supporting] circles over the ocean to except [Antonescu and his cabinet ministers] 
from the noble principle of rehabilitation and restitution of property confiscated 
by a regime eager to liquidate by all means Romania’s political, military, and 
social elites”.
Aldine and the would-be ”democratic” and pro-Western daily România liberă 
would often carry such views. The first chairman of the PNL, Radu Câmpeanu, 
became one of the first supporters of depicting the Holocaust in ”deflective” terms. 
In 1991 he told Totok that Romania cannot be accused of having participated in the 
Holocaust, as during the war the country had been for all practical purposes under 
German occupation. Antonescu himself, according to the then PNL leader, had 
been ”a great Romanian” and among Germany’s allies Romania had produced the 
smallest number of victims – some 60 000 ”at most”. It was only to Hungary-occupied 
northern Transylvania that one can apply the term ”Holocaust”, Câmpeanu claimed. 
1  Mediafax, 14 June 1999.
2  William TOTOK, ”Rumänien wird zur Hochburg der Antisemiten”, Die Tageszeitung, 
27 October 1998.
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Antonescu had tried to defend Romania’s Jews and was ”as successful as possible 
under the prevailing circumstances”, he said1.
There are many aspects to ”reactive antisemitism,” but the most recent ones 
refer to what has been called ”the competition of the victims” or ”competitive 
martyrology” between the Holocaust and the Gulag2. To avoid any misunderstanding, 
let me clearly state that ”reactive antisemites” would be surprised to observe that 
anyone can consider them as having an anti-Jewish prejudice. Addressing the issue of 
competitive martyrology in a more general analytical framework, Dan Stone rightly 
titles it a ”memory war”3. Rather than dealing with history, one deals in this case with 
what Pierre Nora in 1989 termed as a dispute among ”counter memories”4. While not 
necessarily explicit antisemitic, partisans of this symmetric or double genocide approach 
often imply that Jews indulge in ”monopolizing sufferance”, mostly in order to 
conceal their participation in and responsibility for their country’s sufferance under 
communist rule. Romania is by no means a singular case in this category, but as Tables 
7 and 7a show, the impact of such contentions cannot be overlooked either.
One of the unplanned and unforeseen effects of the demise of communism, 
Stone remarks, has been (in both East and West) the disappearance of the imposed 
or assumed consensus that the extreme right had been a political plague. With the 
publication in France of the Black Book of Communism and its explicit claim that the 
communist regime made more victims than Nazism or fascism ever did, revisionist 
historians like Ernst Nolte seemed to be vindicated that the European ”civil war” had 
been one of defense.
This breaking down of the postwar consensus can also be seen at work in the rhetoric 
of the ”double genocide” that informs a wave of new museums in post-communist Eastern 
Europe. In Budapest’s Terror House5, in Tallinn and Riga’s Occupation Museums, and in 
Vilnius’s Museum of the Victims of Genocide, the memories of Nazism and communism 
are placed in competition with each other, and anti-fascism is only employed insofar as it 
does not impinge on the anti-communist narrative… Indeed, [historian István] Rév goes 
as far as to argue that the Terror House, with its overwhelming focus on the communist 
period, is not meant as a space of memory at all, but is ”a total propaganda space, where 
death and victims are used as rhetorical devices”6.
There has been an obvious attempt in Romania from the part of the remnants of 
the Iron Guard and their young followers to monopolize anti-communist resistance. 
1  Interview registered on 2 November 1990. Fragments were broadcast on RIAS-Berlin on 
5 February 1991. I am grateful to Totok for this information.
2  Jean-Michel CHAUMONT,  La Concurrence des victime: génocide, identité, reconnaissance, 
Éditions la Découverte, Paris, 1997; Alan S. ROSENBAUM, ”Introduction to First Edition,” in 
IDEM, Is the Holocaust Unique?: Perspectives on Comparative Genocide, second edition, Westview, 
Boulder, CO, 2001, p. 2.
3  Dan STONE, ”Memory Wars in the ’New Europe’”, in IDEM (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Postwar European History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 714-731.
4  Pierre NORA, ”Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, Representations, 
no. 26, Spring 1989, pp. 13-25.
5  For my own views on the Terror House see Michael SHAFIR, ”The Politics of Public 
Space and the Legacy of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Hungary”, Zeitgeschichte-online, June 
2004, http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/Portals/_Rainbow/documents/pdf/asm_oeu/
shafir_asm.pdf.
6  Dan STONE, ”Memory Wars...cit.”, p. 723.
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When the Sighet Memorial Museum for the Victims of Communism and of Resistance 
was opened in 1993, veterans of the Guard attempted to take over the event, triggering 
the public protest of prominent anti-communist dissident Doina Cornea1. The 
memorial itself helped them, for it made no distinction between the democratic leaders 
imprisoned at Sighet (a prison for political prisoners that functioned between May 1950 
and June 1955 as an extermination center for the country’s political, religious, economic 
and administrative elites, being then transformed into a common prison2) and Iron 
Guardists jailed there. In the last years, that drive has intensified within the process of 
the condemnation of communism. There have been demands for the canonization of 
the ”prison’s saints”, many of whom were members or sympathizers of the legion3. In 
one such instance, they posted on the Internet the celebration of Father Iustin Pârvu’s 
92nd birthday, where nuns sang the Iron Guard’s anthem, ”Holy Legionary Youth” and 
other Iron Guard songs4. That anthem is often intoned at ceremonies organized by the 
supporters of the Guard at different commemorations5 and Pârvu attended some of 
them personally in the past. And so did prominent negationist Coja6 or Corneliu Zelea 
Codreanu’s grandson, Florea Nicador Codreanu. At one of these ceremonies, Florea 
Nicador Codreanu said the ”Captain’s” assassination at the order of King Carol II had 
taken place ”at the orders of international Jewry” and that Romania was facing a new 
invasion by the same Jewry, with 600 000 Jews having allegedly taken up Romanian 
citizenship7. According to Coja, a secret plan approved by the Romanian government 
has as target granting citizenship to one million Jews8. Although these gatherings 
are obviously an infringement on Law prohibiting the display of fascist symbols, the 
Prosecutor General’s Office has never heeded complaints.
More significant (that is to say with larger impact) is the fact that the struggle 
against communism takes primacy over the alleged ”detail” that some of its champions 
were notorious Iron Guardists, who, like Antonescu and for much of the same reason, 
are transformed into national heroes. Not long after the death of Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu 
(to whose funerals former Premier and PNL leader Călin Popescu Tăriceanu sent a 
1  Michael SHAFIR, ”O tragicomedie în desfăşurare?”, in Radio-grafii şi alte fobii, Institutul 
European, Iaşi, 2010, p. 132, reproducing the article under the same title first published in Sfera 
politicii, no. 61, July-August 1998.
2  Gabriela CRISTEA, Simina RADU-BUCURENCI, ”Raising the Cross: Exorcising 
Romania’s Communist Past in Museums, Memorials and Monuments”, in Oksana SARKISOVA, 
Péter APOR (eds.), Past for the Eyes. East European Representations of Communism in Cinema and 
Museums after 1989, Central European University Press, Budapest and New York, 2008, p. 298.
3  For the communist and post-communist careers of such figures, among whom were 
Patriarch Teoctist, Metropolitan Bishop Valeriu Anania and others see Lavinia STAN, Lucian 
TURCESCU, Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2007, pp. 71-73, 204-205 and passim.
4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPjkEtCzp-Y, accessed on February 20, 2011
5 For instance, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F0mErVyn5qw&feature=related; 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QbHXGBeNj6Q&feature=related, accessed on September 
15, 2010.
6 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJAq2WBqq5Q&feature=related, accessed on Decem-
ber 8, 2009.
7 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oyHAx16094E&NR=1, accessed on November 29, 
2009.
8 http://www.ioncoja.ro/la-zi/nu-nici-vorba/, accessed on April 21, 2011.
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wreath1), young screen director Constantin Popescu produced the feature film Portrait 
of the fighter as a young man. Based on Ogoranu’s life story, the film (which won a 
distinction at a Berlin festival) never mentioned his affiliation to the Iron Guard, 
to whom he had remained faithful to his last breath. Indeed, Ogoranu’s coffin was 
draped in the Guard’s standard at his funerals and he was given the last salute with a 
raised hand-fascist style. None of these ”details” found their way in Popescu’s heroic 
depiction2. Nor was that the first such instance. A highly popular series repeatedly 
shown on national and private TV channels titled Memorial to Suffering produced 
by Lucia Hossu-Longin and later released on the market on video and book format3 
never mentioned the past of the frequently-depicted Iron Guardists, but as French 
political scientist Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine shows, time and again insisted on 
the ”genocidal” aspects of communist rule4. The report issued by the presidential 
commission headed by American political scientist Vladimir Tismăneanu (one that 
claimed to be the penchant to that issued by the Elie Wiesel commission) did precisely 
the same, making no distinction whatever among extreme-right ”victims” imprisoned 
or liquidated under communist rule and the other victims, and ignoring Ogoranu’s 
legionary past5. In a chapter produced by the Association of Former Political 
Prisoners in Romania, the commission improperly used the concept of ”genocide” in 
reference to the crimes against humanity of the former regime, precisely in order to 
place communist rule on the same foot6 with the Holocaust, and inflated the number 
of victims (estimated at two million), which triggered the overt distance taking by 
two of its members (Andrei Pippidi and Dorin Dobrincu)7. In brief, the ”symmetric” 
approach loomed large in the report, even if it was never used in the document.
By far the most influential figure among these ”reactive antisemites” was 
commission member Monica Lovinescu, though by then she was too ill to actively 
1  ”Lacrimi la căpătâiul liderului partizanilor din Munţii Făgăraş. Ion Gavrilă Ogoranu s-a 
frânt, dar nu s-a îndoit”, România liberă, 5 May 2006.
2  Cf. http://www.iedb.net/movie/portrait-of-the-fighter-as-a-young-man, accessed on 
November 29, 2011; Roxana LUPU „Povestea cutremurătoare a luptătorului Ogoranu”, Adevărul, 
28 November 2010; Mihai FULGER, ”Bienala românilor”, Observator cultural, 15 February 
2010, http://www.observatorcultural.ro/FILM.-Berlinala-romanilor*articleID_23256-articles_
details.html, accessed on February 15, 2010 and ”Tablou de grup cu partinici şi partizani”, 
Observator cultural, no.552, 26 November 2010, http://www.observatorcultural.ro/FILM.-
Tablou-de-grup-cu-partinici-si-partizani*articleID_24617-articles_details.html, accessed on 
November 26, 2010; Liviu ORNEA, ”La început de an: tristeţi, dezamăgiri, decepţii”, Observator 
cultural, no. 559, 21 January 2001, http://www.observatorcultural.ro/BIFURCATII.-La-inceput-
de-an-tristeti-dezamagiri-deceptii*articleID_24811-articles_details.html, accessed on January 
21, 2001; William TOTOK, ”Istorie unilaterală?”, Radio France Internationale (in Romanian), 
http://mobil.rfi.ro/articol/stiri/cultura/istorie-unilaterala, accessed on March 10, 2010.
3 Lucia HOSSU-LONGIN, Memorialul durerii. O istorie care nu se învaţă la şcoală, Humanitas, 
Bucureşti, 2007.
4  Alexandra LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, ”Fascism and Communism in Romania”, in Henry 
ROUSSO (ed.), Stalinism and Nazism. History and Memory Compared, University of Nebraska 
Press, Lincoln and London, 2004, p. 343.
5  Comisia Prezidenţială pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România, Raport final, 
eds. Vladimir Tismăneanu, Dorin Dobrincu, Cristian Vasile, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2007, 
pp. 676-677.
6  Ibidem, pp. 461-462
7 See note 4, p. 463.
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participate in the report’s making. In March 1992, Lovinescu was raising objections to 
the publication by exiled Romania Jewish writer Norman Manea in The New Republic 
of a tract on the fascist past of the internationally famed historian of religion Mircea 
Eliade, a personal friend1. After the fall of communism, Eliade had been turned in 
Romania into practically an intellectual national idol. Enjoying tremendous prestige 
and influence in Romania, Lovinescu – daughter of Romania’s most influential liberal-
minded and Western-oriented literary critic Eugen Lovinescu – had been encouraging 
intellectual resistance to the communist regime from the microphone of Radio Free 
Europe between 1964 and 1992, when the then Munich-based station liquidated 
its Paris bureau. When the regime was indulging into its aberrant promotion of 
”National Communism”, Monica Lovinescu had been its most eloquent opponent 
in the West. She often denounced the echoes of Legionary ideology in the regime’s 
propaganda, indeed came out in defense of Manea himself. But once the specter 
that had united all opponents of the Ceauşescu regime had vanished, Lovinescu 
(whose mother had perished in communist prisons), was at the head of those moved 
by the drive to have communist perpetrators subjected to a Nürnberg-like ”Trial of 
Communism”. Reading Manea, she said, ”one wonders if one is not the victim of a 
hallucination”. Was the Iron Guard at the helm for just a few months, or vice versa? 
Was it communist supporters who were imprisoned by Antonescu and left prison only 
in 1964, or were these Legionnaires? Was one dreaming in 1989 that Europe had rid 
itself of ”communist terror” while in fact it had just emerged from a ”fascist terror?”2. 
In the preface to a book amassing her articles published in the Writers’ Union weekly 
România literară between February 1996 and November 2001, Lovinescu went one 
step further, depicting a conspiracy aimed at deflecting attention from the communist 
criminal past: 
”Is it still necessary to ask myself whether the resurgence of the anti-
fascist obsession is not aimed at camouflaging the real crimes of communism 
and hiding its perpetrators? A rhetorical question, whose answer is inevitably 
assertive. Right-wing negationism is succeeded by left-wing negationism, and 
the latter is ampler than the former”3.
That torch was passed on after her death in 2008 to philosopher and essayist 
Gabriel Liiceanu, the unofficial leader of the intellectually influential Group for Social 
Dialogue and the no less influential director of the Humanitas publishing house. I have 
elsewhere dealt with Liiceanu’s attempt of 1997 to place the equality symbol between 
the Holocaust and the Gulag and suggest that Jews made themselves collectively 
guilty of Romania’s communization4. That was by no means a one-time incident and 
despite criticism, the philosopher never gave up on it. On the contrary, it became a 
sort of obsession with him. In an apparent attempt to justify the 1997 incident, he was 
noting in a sort of diary published five years later:
1  Norman MANEA, ”Felix Culpa”, The New Republic, 5 August 1991. For further details 
see my ”The Man They Love to Hate: Norman Manea’s ’Snail House’ Between Holocaust and 
Gulag”, East European Jewish Affairs, no. 1, 2000, pp. 60-81.
2  Monica LOVINESCU, ”Câteva confuzii”, Revista 22, no.10, 13-19 March 1992.
3  Monica LOVINESCU, Diagonale, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 6.
4  ”The Man They Love to Hate…cit.”, pp. 74-75. See also Alexandra LAIGNEL-LAVASTINE, 
”Fascism and Communism…cit.”, pp. 178-179.
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”Is it so difficult to grasp that one must first settle accounts with the evil one 
has encountered, that turmoil one’s life, deflected one’s history and from whose 
consequences one cannot escape even one decade after it had left the stage? And 
that only by analogy one is then able to comprehend all forms of evil and to open 
up to a different sufferance, that otherwise would have been more difficult to 
grasp? My path to the Shoah crosses the trauma of communism and this is precisely 
why I am capable to see a brother in every Jew – with his anxieties, his hates and 
his memories of his kindred sufferance. Is it too much to demand a symmetric 
treatment? Is it unjustified that I be granted the right to my own anxieties, hates 
and memory for the sufferance of my own kindred, as well as to the compassion 
that should properly accompany them by those who did not experience them? Do 
not 45 years of systematically mutilated lives entitle us to any tear?
Whence the risk that that a sufferance loose its aura of sufferance because 
another exists? Whence the conceited refusal of cohabitation in sufferance? 
Whence this claim admitting no contradiction to unique victimhood?”1.
”The Jews did not forget those who killed their children, brothers and parents in 
Nazi concentration camps”, Liiceanu told an interviewer in 1993. 
”Who can force us to forget our dead, those jailed and tortured, our grey 
lives, our broken destinies, the unending abasements, the lies in which we were 
forced to live and that governed our lives minute by minute? Are there two 
measures and two different memories for the same deeds?”2
Liiceanu’s views are shared by many of his peers. This is precisely (as he openly 
admits3) these intellectuals became President Băsescu’s unconditional defenders 
after (for opportunistic reasons) Băsescu – a former communist – pronounced in 
Parliament in December 2006 his official condemnation of the former regime based on 
the presidential commission’s report. However, not all these intellectuals would settle 
down for ”symmetry”. When former President Constantinescu in 1997 Romanian 
responsibility (not to be understood as culpability) for the Holocaust4, which he 
reiterated during a visit paid at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum one 
year later, Floricel Marinescu, a historian with connections to the previous regime, 
in March 1998 published a furious article in the România liberă weekly supplement 
Aldine in which not a single cliché employed in the ”double genocide” argument was 
1  Gabriel LIICEANU, Uşa interzisă, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2002, pp. 256-257.
2  IDEM, ”Există două măsuri şi două memorii pentru aceleaşi fapte?”, Revista 22, no. 4, 
28 January-3 February 1993, reproduced in IDEM, Estul naivităţilor noastre. 27 de interviuri 1990-
2011, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2012, p. 77.
3  IDEM, ”M-am gândit să nu păstrez cuvintele doar pentru mine”, interview on Brașov 
TV station MixTV, 19 November 2010, reproduced in IDEM, Estul naivităților noastre...cit., 
p. 231.
4 This important statement (though very cautiously formulated) is usually overlooked, the 
merit for assuming responsibility being attributed to President Ion Iliescu and his acceptance 
of the ”Wiesel Commission” findings. Constantinescu said during a visit paid at the Bucharest 
Choral Temple: ”The death of innocents can be neither forgiven, nor undone, nor forgotten...
As president of all Romanians, it is my duty to be the guarantor of that memory, no matter how 
painful that is; it is my duty to safeguard the memory of Jews who fell victim to the genocide” 
(Realitatea evreiască, no. 49-50, 16 April-15 May 1997).
603
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XII • no. 4 • 2012
Political Antisemitism in Romania? 
missing. With the difference that he left no doubt as to ”who did more wrong onto 
whom”. As Marinescu put it, 
”from the strict quantitative perspective, the number of crimes perpetrated in 
the name of communist ideology is much larger than that of those perpetrated in 
the name of Nazi or similar ideologically minded regimes”.
Yet 
”no prominent Jewish personality [from Romania] has apologized for the role that 
some Jews have played in undermining Romanian statehood, in the country’s 
Bolshevization, in the crimes and the atrocities committed [by them]. Proportionally 
speaking, the Romanians and Romania suffered more at the hands of the communist 
regime, whose oncoming the Jews had made an important contribution to, than 
the Jews themselves had suffered from the Romanian state during the Antonescu 
regime.... The Red Holocaust was incomparably more grave than Nazism”1.
In his seminal Rethinking the Holocaust, Yehuda Bauer stresses the role of 
”Lumpenintellectuals” in the emergence of Nazi ideology. These intellectuals, he writes, 
were people who were 
”largely unemployed, exceedingly bitter regarding the bourgeois society that 
rejected them for a variety of reasons, searching for explanations for their 
disappointment in a society that appeared to be disintegrating”.
It would be these people who would form the future ”Nazi elite”. The danger of 
drawing parallels in different historical contexts notwithstanding, such ”transition 
losers” are not absent in Romania (or elsewhere in the region), where the form the 
backbone of PRM supporters. However, it is only
”[w]hen an intellectual or pseudo-intellectual elite with a genocidal program, 
whether explicit or implicit, achieves power in a crisis-ridden society for 
economic, social, and political reasons that have nothing to do with the genocidal 
program, then, if that elite can draw the intellectual strata to its side, genocide will 
become possible. By intellectual strata I mean what John Weiss describes as elites: 
upper-class social groups, army officers, church leaders, bureaucrats, doctors 
and lawyers, industrial and commercial elites, and especially the university 
professors who provide all the rest with the necessary ideological tools. A social 
consensus will be created with the help of these elites: the consensus will provide 
justification for ordinary folks to participate in the genocidal program”2.
Political antisemitism is not born at that point. By then it might be too late to do 
anything about it.
1  România liberă supplement Aldine, 7 March 1988. 
2  Yehuda BAUER, Rethinking the Holocaust, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London, 2002, pp. 104-105.
